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“Reforming America’s marijuana laws can be likened to assembling a 
jigsaw puzzle: finding the first few pieces to join is difficult and time 
consuming, but the more the pieces come together the clearer the 
puzzle’s pattern becomes and the easier the job gets.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1930s, anti-marijuana propaganda, combined with what some call 
legislative carelessness, led to the demonization of cannabis, marking it as the 
antithesis to mainstream American culture.2 Indeed, in 1969, only 12% of 
Americans supported legalization of marijuana.3 But recently, the federal 
government has taken a relaxed approach to enforcing marijuana laws, allowing 
states that have legalized to realize the potential tax benefits from marijuana.4 
Now, with national support at 60% and successful results in states legalizing 
recreational use, the discussion around legalizing marijuana is heating up.5 On 
November 8, 2016, California voters legalized recreational marijuana with the 
 
1. Jeffrey Miron, Ph.D., A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Legalizing Marijuana, in THE POT BOOK: A 
COMPLETE GUIDE TO CANNABIS 447, 461 (JULIE HOLLAND ED., 2010). 
2. See generally, Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of 
Knowledge: An Inquiry Into the Legal History of Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971, 1054 (1970) 
(reviewing the historic origin of marijuana prohibition and public discourse in the United States). 
3. Art Swift, Support for Legal Marijuana Use Up to 60% in U.S., GALLUP (Oct. 19, 2016), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/196550/support-legal-marijuana.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review).  
4. Alex Halperlin, Trump Probably Won’t Crush the Legal Weed Industry, But He Could Do Something 
Worse, SLATE (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2017/03/trump_probably 
_won_t_crush_legal_weed.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
5. See Swift, supra note 3 (highlighting increases in support for legalization across socio-political 
backgrounds). 
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passage of Proposition 64 (Prop. 64), also known as the Adult Use of Marijuana 
Act (AUMA).6 That same day, voters in Nevada, Massachusetts, and Maine 
passed similar propositions.7 Undeniably, passing these laws have swung the 
door to legalization wide open.8 Now, the United States is bracing itself for an 
industry expected to grow “faster than ganja under grow lights.”9 
Indeed, the promise of generating new tax revenue is one of the main reasons 
supporting legalization.10 Consequently, generating revenue from marijuana sales 
requires a sound tax policy.11 Typically, this requires selecting a tax base, level, 
and collection point.12 Usually, the revenue goes to covering the costs of the law 
and various state programs.13 The successes in Colorado and Washington 
demonstrate the recreational market’s potential for raising tax revenue.14 Now, all 
 
6. California Proposition 64, Marijuana Legalization (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/ 
California_Proposition_64,_Marijuana_Legalization_(2016) (last visited Mar. 15, 2017) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review); Press Release, Marijuana Wins Big On Election Night, Drug Policy 
Alliance, ( Nov. 8, 2017) http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2016/11/marijuana-wins-big-election-night. 
7. See Legalization, NORML, http://norml.org/legal/legalization (last visited Mar. 15, 2017) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (summarizing information on the states that have fully legalized 
medical and recreational marijuana). 
8. See Madison Margolin, The Pot Law That Could Be ‘Deal Breaker for the Drug War,’ ROLLING STONE 
(July 5, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-pot-law-that-could-be-deal-breaker-for-the-drug-
war-20160705 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the inevitable 
industrialization of the marijuana industry and California’s potential to further validate it). 
9. Carol Tice, Why Legal Cannabis Is 2015’s Best Startup Opportunity, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2017, 7:34 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/caroltice/2015/02/05/why-legal-cannabis-is-2015s-best-startup-
opportunity/#682a95613f2c (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
10. E.g., JOHNATHAN P. CAULKINS, BEAU KILMER & MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: 
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 146–47 (2d ed. 2016) (highlighting how the promise of increased tax 
revenue is one of the main reasons supporting legalization); STEERING COMM., BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON 
MARIJUANA POL’Y, PATHWAYS REPORT: POLICY OPTIONS FOR REGULATING MARIJUANA IN CALIFORNIA, 48 
(2015), available at https://www.safeandsmartpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/BRCPathwaysReport.pdf 
[hereinafter BRC Report] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (pointing out how increased 
revenue is one of the reasons supporting legalization in California). 
11. See, BEAU KILMER ET AL., RAND DRUG POL’Y RES. CTR., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FROM VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS 76–77 (2015) (reviewing the 
complexities and nuances of taxing marijuana). 
12. See id. at 76 (pointing out that in addition to the tax level, legislatures must also determine when and 
how to tax marijuana). 
13. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 48 (highlighting that a successful marijuana tax system will 
generate revenue for “increased education, public health, and enforcement costs associated with marijuana 
cultivation and use”). 
14. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 10, at 216. (highlighting that the “general absence of disaster” in 
Colorado and Washington is good in and of itself); see also Katelyn Newman, Milestoned: Colorado Pot Tax 
Revenue Surpasses $500M, U.S. NEWS (July 20, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/colorado/ 
articles/2017-07-20/colorado-pot-tax-revenue-surpasses-500-million (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (highlighting the revenue that Colorado and Washington have generated from the marijuana 
market).  
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eyes are on the Golden State as it seeks to become the “golden standard of 
legalization.”15 Certainly, with the country’s top population and the sixth biggest 
economy in the world, California’s impact on marijuana will be massive.16 Some 
projections estimate that California could generate around $1 billion in tax 
revenue alone.17 Now, state officials in California are ready to start spending the 
money that recreational marijuana may bring.18 Nonetheless, successfully 
generating revenue off the recreational market largely depends on unknowable, 
and unpredictable, variables.19 
Although Colorado and Washington have generated plenty of revenue from 
their markets, the differences between each state make revenue projections 
unpredictable.20 Further, any marijuana tax regime “will not fit for long” because 
the “industry will evolve in unpredictable ways.”21 For instance, high prices 
when legal sales begin could polarize consumers toward the illicit market and 
stall industry growth.22 At the same time, low prices could undercut a state’s 
revenue goals.23 Moreover, marijuana’s illegal status under federal law 
contributes to the recreational market’s volatility.24 Along these lines, criminal 
enforcement, banking, and IRS tax rules have the potential to slow down market 
growth and decrease revenue.25 Additionally, with the oldest medical marijuana 
industry in the country, California presents a unique challenge for regulators.26 
 
15. Margolin, supra note 8. 
16. Josh Sanburn, States Lean Left on Local Votes, TIME, Nov. 21, 2016, at 16. 
17. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 64: MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION INITIATIVE STATUTE 
1 (July 20, 2016), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2016/Prop64-110816.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
18. See Thomas Fuller, Marijuana Industry Presses Ahead in California’s Wine Country, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 18, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/us/california-marijuana-wine-country.html?_r=0 (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing California local official’s eagerness to embrace the 
marijuana industry). 
19. See Michael Vitiello, Legalizing Marijuana and Abating Environmental Harm: An Overblown 
Promise?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773, 782 (2016) (discussing that additional tax revenue depends on “many 
variables, including methods of implementation of Marijuana laws”). 
20. See MILES LIGHT ET AL, MARIJUANA POL’Y GRP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION IN COLORADO 20 (2016) (observing the variance between “regulatory structures” due to the 
unique “legalization processes” in each state). 
21. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 88. 
22. See id. at 78 (discussing how high prices will benefit “bootleggers” in the black and “fake medical 
market” rather than the legal market).  
23. See id. (observing how lower prices will cause a decline in revenue generated from marijuana sales). 
24. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 15. 
25. Id. at 15. 
26. Id. at 12. 
 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49 
159 
Accordingly, a sound cannabis tax scheme must plan for these and other 
uncertainties.27 
A tax regime that strives for fast income will be more susceptible to the 
unstable conditions of the market.28 While most of the current discussion focuses 
on how those unpredictable conditions will negatively impact the cannabis 
industry’s potential for tax revenue, this Article seeks to broaden the discussion 
of those factors within the legislature’s control to maximize revenue.29 
Specifically, this Article focuses on how to minimize risk in the recreational 
market and facilitate its growth.30 This Article will demonstrate that California 
should adopt several mechanisms for adjusting the marijuana tax rate, as 
recommended in the RAND report, because the current tax scheme is too 
aspiring and will result in slower market growth over time.31 Examples of such 
mechanisms include scheduling future tax rate increases and exploiting untapped 
tax bases.32 Indeed, a tax scheme that focuses on a short rate of return rather than 
long term gain will fail to optimize cannabis tax revenue.33 By minimizing risk 
and facilitating market growth, California could be the golden standard of the 
cannabis industry.34 
Part II of this Article is divided into five parts. Part II examines how federal 
law may impact the amount of revenue generated from the recreational market.35 
It then provides background on various methodologies used to measure and 
collect marijuana taxes.36 It will also examine the tax schemes in the recreational 
markets of Colorado and Washington.37 Part II then discusses California’s unique 
history with marijuana, as well as its medical and recreational marijuana 
structures.38 
Part III discusses the potential issues that may percolate under Proposition 
64’s tax regime,39 such as the implications of the tax base and collection point 
 
27. Pat Ogelsby, Best Marijuana Taxes Yet: California’s Proposition 64, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 
2016, 5:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pat-oglesby/best-marijuana-taxes-yet-_b_12354248.html (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
28. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 88. 
29. Infra Part IV. 
30. Infra Part IV. 
31. Infra Part V. 
32. Infra Part IV.B. 
33. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 88 (predicting that the “marijuana market will not soon be 
stable” and that “revenue would suffer from too ambitious a tax plan”). 
34. Infra Part V. 
35. Infra Part II.A 
36. Infra Part II.B 
37. Infra Part II.C 
38. Infra Part II.D 
39. Infra Part III.A 
 
2017 / Will California Realize the Fiscal Benefits of Cannabis Legalization? 
160 
under Prop. 64.40 It also examines how federal law may impact the success of 
California’s tax scheme.41 
Part IV considers potentially unexploited tax bases, and where opportunities 
for tax evasion may exist.42 Lastly, part IV examines practical implications of 
adopting mechanisms for adjusting the tax rate, alongside additional tax bases.43 
Part V concludes that the proposed changes, if adopted, would reduce tax evasion 
in California, reduce the illicit market, facilitate the legal market, and minimize 
the future risk in the market.44 
II. PUTTING THE PUZZLE OF MARIJUANA POLICY TOGETHER 
This part addresses the history and present status of marijuana under federal 
law.45 Next, it provides background information on different types of excise tax 
bases commonly used for taxing marijuana.46 Then, it discusses at what point in 
the supply chain marijuana taxes are levied and collected.47 Additionally, this 
section describes the current marijuana tax regimes in both Colorado and 
Washington.48 Finally, it details the history of California’s unique relationship 
with marijuana, as well as its current medical and recreational marijuana 
structures.49 
A. Federal Law 
Marijuana’s relationship with the federal government is not only long and 
complex, but also highly unstable.50 Beginning in the 1930s, Harry Anslinger 
undertook an unfounded, propaganda filled campaign, establishing a demonized 
caricature of cannabis in the public discourse.51 This effort culminated in 1937, 
 
40. Infra Part III.B 
41. Infra Part III.C 
42. Infra Part IV.A 
43. Infra Part IV.B 
44. Infra Part V. 
45. Infra Part II.A. 
46. Infra Part II.B. 
47. Infra Part II.C. 
48. Infra Part II.D. 
49. Infra Part II.E. 
50. See generally Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 2 (reviewing the historic origin of marijuana 
prohibition and public discourse in the United States). 
51. See Michael Vitiello, Legalizing Marijuana: California’s Pot of Gold?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1349, 
1357 (2009) (reviewing Harry Anslinger’s aggressive enforcement of marijuana laws through the use of 
unscientific claims and “appeal to racism and hysteria”). 
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when Congress essentially criminalized possession of marijuana with the passage 
of the Marijuana Tax Act.52 This theme continued with the passing of the Boggs 
Act in 1951, which increased punishments for marijuana possession.53 In 1970, 
the passing of the Controlled Substances Act classified marijuana a Schedule 1 
substance.54 Drugs classified as Schedule 1 are found to have a high potential for 
abuse and no known medical use.55 In Gonzalez v. Raich, the Supreme Court held 
that it was constitutional for Congress to regulate marijuana under the Commerce 
Clause to the U.S Constitution.56 Thus, even in states where cannabis is legal, 
like in California, it remains illegal under federal law.57 The punishment for 
possessing, selling or manufacturing58 a Schedule 1 substance is severe.59 Hence, 
the potential negative impact of federal law on state recreational markets is hard 
to ignore. 60 
In 2013, under the Obama administration, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
outlined eight enforcement priorities for U.S. attorneys in a memorandum issued 
by Deputy Attorney General James Cole (Cole Memorandum II).61 In 2014, the 
DOJ and U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN) released new banking guidelines aimed at lessening restrictions on 
access to financial services for the marijuana industry.62 In other words, the DOJ 
and FinCEN intended for the documents to leave alone those market participants 
who are following state law.63 While this was an improvement from the federal 
government’s past enforcement policies, it was ineffective in resolving many of 
 
52. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, 75 P.L. 238 (repealed 1970). 
53. Act of Nov. 2, 1951, ch. 666, 65 STAT. 767, as cited in Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 2, at 1054. 
54. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012); BRC Report, supra note 10, at 56. 
55. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2016); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 81–82 (2015). 
56. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005) (holding that Congress may criminalize marijuana under 
the Commerce Clause to the U.S. Constitution). 
57. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 56. 
58. Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2016). 
59. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 82–83; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney 
General to All U.S. Attorneys 1-2 (Aug. 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo II], available at https://www.justice. 
gov/iso/opa/resources/ 3052013829132756857467.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
60. See Robert Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other Federal Crimes, 2010 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 223, 248–249 (2010) (highlights the increased risk for tax evasion when considering federal law). 
61. Cole Memo II, supra note 59; Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 77–78. 
62. See, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-G001: BSA 
EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES (Feb. 14, 2014), available at http://1.usa. 
gov/1U11dlK (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter FinCEN Guidance]; Rachel 
Cheasty Sanders, To Weed or Not to Weed? The Colorado Quandary of Legitimate Marijuana Businesses and 
the Financial Institutions Who Are Unable to Serve Them, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 281, 295 (2015). 
63. See Sanders, supra note 62 (reviewing the specific procedures under FinCEN guidance that banks 
must follow). 
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the significant problems that arise under federal law in relation to recreational 
marijuana.64 Moreover, Jefferson Sessions, the current Attorney General, under 
the new administration, has signaled his intent to increase the level of 
enforcement of federal drug laws.65 But action has yet to be taken, and some in 
the industry believe that the momentum of legalization might be enough to stop 
any strict enforcement policy.66 Recently, legislators have proposed laws to 
reform marijuana laws at the federal level, but the effect of this remains to be 
seen.67 
Nevertheless, issues with banking and tax law create several uncertainties for 
the recreational market.68 First, businesses in the marijuana industry have limited 
access to banking services.69 This forces the industry to operate on a cash only 
basis.70 One consequence of this is that “dispensaries that operate as cash 
businesses… [become]… targets of robbery and violent crime.”71 Further, “it 
leads to massive cash payments being delivered to tax-collecting agencies.”72 
Certainly, better access to banking will help the recreational marijuana market 
thrive.73 
Second, IRS tax rules present another challenge facing the recreational 
market.74 Federal Tax Rule section 280E “requires . . . businesses . . . in violation 
 
64. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 89–90. 
65. Alex Pasquariello, Here’s How Jeff Sessions Has Disrupted the Marijuana Industry with Words 
Alone, THE CANNABIST (Apr. 21, 2017, 8:14 AM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/04/21/jeff-sessions-
marijuana-legalization-impact/77938/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
66. Aaron Smith, Marijuana Businesses Worry About Trump, But Expect to Prevail, CNN (June 8, 2017, 
9:06 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/17/smallbusiness/trump-sessions-marijuana/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
67. Mollie Reilly, New Legislation Would Force The Federal Government To Treat Marijuana Like 
Alcohol, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2017, 2:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/marijuana-reform-
bills_us_58dd2504e4b0e6ac7092d842 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reviewing bills 
that have been “introduced in the U.S. Senate and House” to reform federal marijuana laws). 
68. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 77 (noting that the conflict between state and federal marijuana 
laws “create debilitating instability and uncertainty” in states taking a novel approach to regulating marijuana). 
69. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 17; Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 91. 
70. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 17 (describing the risks dispensaries face operating as a cash only 
business because of limited access to banks); see also Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 91 (pointing out 
how marijuana “businesses often have no choice but to keep large quantiles of cash on hand”). 
71. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 17; Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 91. 
72. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 17; Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 91. 
73. See Alice Wallace, New Federal Bill Would Allow Banking for Marijuana Businesses, THE 
CANNABIST (Apr. 27, 2017, 12:20 PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/04/27/federal-marijuana-banking-bill-
congress-perlmutter/78531/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting the current 
issues with federal guidance on state marijuana regulations and the proposed changes to federal regulation of 
marijuana). 
74. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 94. 
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of federal drug laws … to pay federal income tax.”75 But, section 280E does not 
allow businesses in the cannabis industry to deduct expenses before calculating 
taxable income.76 For example, marijuana businesses cannot deduct “rent, 
employee payroll, lights, and heating and cooling;” which other businesses can 
normally deduct.77 The only deductions allowed under section 280E are “the cost 
of goods sold [and] amounts paid to produce or purchase marijuana.”78 
Interestingly, Washington’s 37% excise tax at the point of sale may circumvent 
the issue under section 280E by shifting the tax to the consumer.79 Nevertheless, 
section 280E presents another limitation to generating tax revenue from 
marijuana.80 
B. How Are Marijuana Taxes Measured? 
Excise taxes are primarily used to measure tax rates for marijuana.81 An 
excise tax is “a specific tax on a product (as we have for alcohol, cigarettes, 
gasoline) that is above and beyond the standard sales tax charged on nearly all 
products.” 82 An excise tax can have several different tax bases, and each tax base 
is subject to its own strength and weaknesses.83 This section mainly focuses on 
three common bases used to measure marijuana excise taxes: (1) ad valorem, (2) 
weight-based, and (3) potency-based.84 It also briefly considers real estate and 
electricity-based excise taxes.85 
1. Ad Valorem (percentage-of-price) 
Most states that have legalized medical and recreational marijuana use an ad 
valorem (percentage-of-price) as a tax base.86 Ad valorem taxes are cost efficient 
 
75. I.R.C. § 280E (2006), as cited in Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at nn94. 
76. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 94. 
77. Id. 
78. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 87-88. 
79. Id.  
80. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 94. 
81. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 49 (noting that the “discussion of marijuana is mainly about excise 
taxes”). 
82. Id. 
83. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 76 (considering a list of 7 criteria when evaluating tax bases: (1) 
Prevention of after-tax price collapse; (2) swiftness of initial tax assessment; (3) potential for cheating; (4) 
simplicity; (5) cost to set up the tax; (6) cost to maintain the tax; (7) whether the base allows for revenue 
maximization as the industry evolves). 
84. Infra Parts II.B.1–II.B.3 
85. Infra Part II.B.4. 
86. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 77 (highlighting that Colorado and Washington’s use of price 
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and easy to set up.87 At the same time, ad valorem taxes also have some 
disadvantages.88 First, an ad valorem tax magnifies any fluctuation of marijuana 
prices.89 Because this tax is based on a percentage of the price, if the pre-tax price 
fluctuates, a price-based tax will amplify that change.90 Consequently, when legal 
sales begin, high pre-tax prices could polarize consumers toward the black and 
medical market and stall industry growth.91 On the other hand, a drop in price 
could undercut the state’s expected revenue.92 Furthermore, low pre-tax prices 
could lead to higher rates of “youth use, abuse, and leakage to other states.’”93 
Second, priced-based taxes can be manipulated by using fake transfers or 
bundling.94 Bundling occurs when marijuana is grouped together with other 
products and taxed at a lower rate.95 Fake transfers occur when two parties, who 
are either the same or closely related, agree on a price that undercuts the tax 
rate.96 On balance, the simplicity and ease of this type of base makes it an 
appropriate measuring tool for cannabis tax policy.97 
2. Weight 
Alternatively, a tax on cannabis can be measured by weight.98 Weight-based 
taxes guarantee revenue, even in the event of a price collapse.99 But weight-based 
 
based taxes for recreational marijuana, and that “many localities have enacted price based taxes on medical 
marijuana.”) 
87. See id at 78. (discussing that price based taxes are “simple... [and do] not require indexing or 
equipment” like weight based taxes); see also BRC Report, supra note 10, at 49 (discussing the simplicity of 
price based taxes that do not require regulators to measure “the weight or potency of a product”). 
88. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 136. 
89. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 136. 
90. Id. at 136. 
91. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78. (discussing how high prices will benefit “bootleggers,” in 
the black and “fake medical market” rather than the legal market). 
92. See id. (observing how lower prices will cause a decline in revenue generated from marijuana sales). 
93. Id. 
94. E.g, CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 136 (pointing out that the problem with ad 
valorem taxes is that it can be “bundled with another product or service”); KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78. 
(highlighting that a problem with price based tax is that it can be manipulated or gamed). 
95. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78–79. 
96. Id. at 79. 
97. See id. at 78 (discussing that price based taxes are “simple . . . [and do] not require indexing or 
equipment” like weight based taxes); see also BRC Report, supra note 10, at 49 (discussing the simplicity of 
price based taxes that do not require regulators to measure “the weight or potency of a product”). 
98. E.g., CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 136 (noting that “marijuana taxes could be 
assessed per unit weight”); BRC Report, supra note 10, at 50–51 (Assessing the advantages and disadvantages 
of a weight based marijuana tax). 
99. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 50 (observing that marijuana revenue will still be generated with a 
weight base tax “even in the event of marijuana price collapse”); see also KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 77; 
 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49 
165 
taxes are complex because they take longer to set up, and must be indexed for 
inflation.100 For example, different parts of the cannabis plant, such as flower and 
trim, are usually taxed at different rates.101 The “flowering tops of female 
[cannabis] plants . . . which [are] valued for [their] high THC102 content, 
enhanced appearance, and a more intense aroma” produces marijuana.103 These 
flowering tops are also commonly referred to as “bud,” and once dried and 
crushed, they can be smoked in a joint or bowl, vaporized, or used to make 
concentrates.104 Trim, on the other hand, includes the rest of the plant material, 
such as the stems and leaves, and often contains a lower THC content.105 Usually, 
marijuana growers process trim to make other forms of marijuana products, such 
as concentrates or edibles.106 Because of the difficulty distinguishing between 
bud and trim, cultivators often attempt to mischaracterize their product to evade 
paying higher taxes.107 Moreover, marijuana’s weight fluctuates as it loses 
moisture.108 Thus, it is important to choose a collection mechanism that accounts 
for this factor.109 In addition, taxing by weight encourages distributors to increase 
the total THC content in their product.110 By increasing the total value without 
increasing the weight, a cultivator can evade paying some taxes.111 By extension, 
 
Oglesby, supra note 27 (pointing out that “an indexed tab based on observable weight is inherently flexible and 
should survive a price collapse”). 
100. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 77; See Oglesby, supra note 27 (observing that weight based taxes 
take time to set up); See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 50–51 (highlighting the importance of properly indexing 
a weight-based marijuana tax for inflation). 
101. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 82–83 (observing the different tax rates Colorado and other 
states apply to marijuana trim and bud).  
102. See Rae Lland, What is THC?, LEAFLY, https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis-101/what-is-
tetrahydrocannabinol (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (THC 
or delta-9-tetrahydrocanabinol is “one of the main psychoactive ingredients in and one of the most responsible 
for its intoxicating effects”). 
103. Lyle Craker & Zoe Gardner, The Botany of Cannabis, in THE POT BOOK: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO 
CANNABIS 35, 43 (Julie Holland ed., 2010). 
104. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 83–84; Craker & Gardner, supra note 103, at 43. 
105. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 83 (highlighting that “bud is generally stronger than trim”). 
106. Id. 
107. See id. (pointing out the danger in tax evasion at the margins of determining what bud and trim 
actually are). 
108. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 50 (discussing the potential future issues about “how to account 
for the fact that, as a harvested plant, marijuana will change in weight as it loses moisture”). 
109. Id. 
110. E.g., id. (discussing how a weight based tax could encourage production of high thc products); 
CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 136 (highlighting the incentive in lowering “the tax per hour 
of intoxication”). 
111. E.g., BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51(discussing how a weight based tax could encourage 
production of high thc products); CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 11, at 136; KILMER ET AL., supra 
note 11, at 83 (highlighting the incentive in lowering “the tax per hour of intoxication”). 
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this “pushes the industry away from mass production [and] toward organic, 
artisanal, and other high-value-added products.”112 Although a weight-based tax 
has several flaws, its protection against a price collapse is important for a sound 
cannabis tax scheme.113 
3. Potency 
Like the alcohol industry, cannabis taxes could be based on potency.114 In 
theory, a potency-based tax would likely be correlated to the THC content of 
marijuana.115 Scholars have recommended lowering the tax rate based on the 
presence of cannabidiol (CBD). 116 A potency-based tax can also be used as a 
secondary tax.117 For example, if there is no system in place for the state to check 
the validity of the alleged THC content of cannabis, one option is to “use the 
seller’s reported or claimed THC content as a secondary or backup alternative 
minimum tax.”118 
However, there are several limitations to a potency-based tax.119 Although 
concentrates and edibles typically have a measurable THC content, the THC 
content of a marijuana flower is often inconsistent and varies immensely.120 
Because accuracy is the crux of assessing taxes based on potency, it is vital to 
have standardized testing in place.121 For instance, if the THC content is 
overstated, then consumers would be paying a higher tax for a lesser product.122 
 
112. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 77. 
113. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 50 (observing that marijuana revenue will still be generated with 
a weight base tax “even in the event of marijuana price collapse”). 
114. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 136. 
115. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51 (discussing the potential for a potency based tax on THC in 
concentrate form prior to being processed into other products, such as edibles, “might yield reliable and 
predictable results”). 
116. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51; What Is CBD?, PROJECT CBD, https://www. 
projectcbd.org/about/what-cbd (last visited Aug. 6, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (“Cannabidiol—CBD—is a cannabis compound that has significant medical benefits, but does not 
make people feel ‘stoned’ and can actually counteract the psychoactivity of THC.”).  
117. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 84. 
118. Id. (Emphasis removed). 
119. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 80–81; see also BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51 (observing that 
that a potency based tax may become more effective when “further capacity for testing, supply chain-
management, and labeling are in place”).  
120. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51; CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 136–37; 
KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 81–82. 
121. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51 (observing that that a potency based tax may become more 
effective when “further capacity for testing, supply chain-management, and labeling are in place”). 
122. See, KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 84 (pointing out that “sellers could dodge the tax entirely by 
falsely understating the THC content”). 
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Alternatively, underreporting the THC content may result in tax evasion.123 In 
addition, the price of cannabis does not always correlate to the THC content 
because factors such as the blend of cannabinoids or aesthetic appeal may be 
more important to the specific consumer.124 Currently, there are no states that 
implement a potency based tax for cannabis.125 As the industry evolves and 
testing standards improve, this type of tax base may become more prevalent.126 
4. Electricity and Real Estate 
 Taxes could also be measured by the amount of space used to grow 
marijuana.127 For example, “Rancho Cordova, California, taxes each 12.5 sq. ft. 
of outdoor grow area at the same rate as one indoor square foot.”128 This type of 
tax is easy to start, collect, and “overlaps with administrative oversight.”129 
However, “a square-footage base correlates poorly with potency,” making it 
unlikely that it becomes the primary tax base.130 
An excise tax on marijuana could be based on electricity used for indoor 
grows.131 For example, Arcata, California “presumes that abnormally high use of 
electricity correlates with marijuana growing under high-powered lights.”132 
Accordingly, they city levies a higher electrical excise tax on those using higher 
amounts of electricity.133 This not only creates additional revenue, but also 
minimizes environmental damage from heavy electricity use.134 Because of the 
narrow nature of the taxes, they work best in conjunction with other tax bases.135 
  
 
123. Id.  
124. See id. at 78 (observing that “high price does not always mean high potency”). 
125. Id. at 80. 
126. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51 (observing that that a potency based tax may become more 
effective when “further capacity for testing, supply chain-management, and labeling are in place”). 
127. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 84–85 (noting that “for medical marijuana, many California 
localities tax growing area”). 
128. Id. at 84. 
129. See id. (stating that a square footage base tax would only be “moderately difficult to set up and 
collect . . . just requiring decisions about exactly what square footage to count”). 
130. Id. at 85. 




135. Id. at 84–85. 
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C. Collecting Marijuana Taxes 
Equally important for a sound cannabis tax scheme is determining where to 
collect the tax.136 The collection point is usually determined by the type of base 
being used.137 Taxes on cannabis are primarily assessed during (1) cultivation or 
(2) retail sales.138 If there are additional stages of production, the state could 
assess taxes at that point too.139 
Ideally, the tax should be assessed at the point with the fewest number of 
people and locations; this is commonly referred to as a choke point.140 For 
example, it easier to collect taxes from a small industry with large corporations 
than a larger industry with smaller participants.141 However, taxing at the source 
of production, where there may be more market participants, allows regulators to 
collect taxes earlier, and identify illegal product sooner.142 Conversely, a taxed 
assessed at retail has the advantage of increasing revenue.143 That is because the 
price of cannabis is higher in the later stages of production.144 Nevertheless, there 
is an advantage to multiple collection points:145 it gives regulators more 
oversight, so the chance of tax evasion decreases.146 Thus, selecting the right 
collection point is vital for ensuring consistent streams of revenue.147 
D. Cannabis Tax Policy in the ‘Mile-High’ and ‘Evergreen’ States 
This part discusses the modern tax scheme in Colorado’s legal marijuana 
market.148 It then examines the current tax regime in Washington’s recreational 
marijuana market.149 
 
136. See id. at 87 (observing that after deciding how the tax will be measured, “jurisdictions that decide to 
tax marijuana need to decide where the tax will be collected”). 
137. Id. at 87. 
138. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 52. 
139. Id. 
140. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 87; but see BRC Report, supra note 10, at 52, 53 (observing the 
advantages of early tax collection, which would be “the opposite of a choke point”). 
141. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 87. 
142. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 53. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 54. 
146. Id. at 54. 
147. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 87 (highlighting that selecting a collection point has “important 
implications for the industry structure, state budgets, and the black market”). 
148. Infra Part II.D.1. 
149. Infra Part II.D.2. 
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1. Colorado 
In November 2012, Colorado legalized cannabis by passing Amendment 
64.150 The law allows persons 21 years or older to purchase up to one ounce of 
cannabis daily,151 while limiting home cultivation to six plants.152 The 
Department of Revenue oversees the marijuana industry, which shares similar 
features with the states regulatory structure on alcohol, particularly liquor.153 
Colorado does not limit potency, bans selling alcohol and/or tobacco and 
cannabis together, and allows coupons.154 
Initially, Colorado had two ad valorem taxes on marijuana.155 Currently, the 
tax on producers “has been de facto converted to a weight based tax” to avoid 
fraud.156 Now, retail marijuana is subject to a 15% excise tax on the average 
market rate.157 Generally, flower is taxed at a higher rate than trim.158 The excise 
tax is then calculated by “multiplying the quantity of retail marijuana product by 
the average market rate at the time, then multiplying [it] by the 15% (excise tax 
rate).”159 When consumers purchase marijuana, the purchase is subject to “the 
2.9% state sales tax, 10% state marijuana sales tax[,]160 and any local sales 
taxes.”161 Prior to giving recreational use the thumbs-up, Colorado legalized the 
 
150. Colorado Marijuana Legalization Initiative, Amendment 64 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, https:// 
ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative,_Amendment_64_(2012) (last visited Mar. 30, 
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Matt Ferner, Amendment 64 Passes: 
Colorado Legalizes Marijuana For Recreational Use, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:24 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/06/amendment-64-passes-in-co_n_2079899.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (summarizing Colorado’s passing of amendment 64). 
151. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(a) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2016 general election). 
152. Id. (limiting the amount of mature plants to three). 
153. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 217. 
154. Id. at 217–18. 
155. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 77. 
156. Id. 
157. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-28.8-302 (West 2015) amended by SB 17-192, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Colo. 2017); Marijuana Taxes/Quick Answers, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE: TAX’N DIVISION 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/tax/marijuana-taxes-quick-answers (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). See also Excise 23: Excise Tax on Retail Marijuana, COLO. DEPT. 
OF REVENUE: TAXPAYER SERV. DIVISION 1 (June 2016), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/ 
sites/default/files/Excise23.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (summarizing 
Colorado’s tax methodology on marijuana). 
158. See Marijuana Taxes/Quick Answers, supra note 157 (summarizing Colorado’s tax methodology on 
marijuana); see also KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 83 (noting that “bud is generally stronger than trim). 
159. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-28.8-302 (West 2015), amended by SB 17-192, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Colo. 2017); Marijuana Taxes/Quick Answers, supra note 157. 
160. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-106(1)(a)(II) (West 2015). 
161. See Marijuana Taxes/Quick Answers, supra note 158 (summarizing Colorado’s Tax methodology on 
marijuana). 
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use of medical marijuana in 2000.162 Medical marijuana is only exempt from the 
10% state tax.163 Unfortunately, the lack of a standardized monitoring system 
prior to legalization limits data pertaining to the medical market’s impact on the 
economy.164 
Colorado assesses 15% excise tax on the first sale or transfer point of 
marijuana.165 This transaction could occur between a cultivator, retailer, or a 
producer.166 In other words, a tax collector can collect taxes “as early as possible 
in the supply chain.”167 There is also a tracking system in place to track 
marijuana from seed to sale.168 If the program works as intended, it prevents tax 
evasion and reduces the illicit market.169 Further, the Department of Agriculture 
calibrates the scales used to determine the amount of the weight tax.170 After the 
tax is paid, the state must still be notified before transport, and the shipment must 
be accompanied “by shipping manifests [and] in bags not more than a pound.”171 
At first, Colorado required all marijuana businesses to be vertically integrated.172 
This means “that only one company handles marijuana from farm to market—all 
the way from seedling to retail sale, with no sellers in between.”173 This 
potentially leads to fraud and tax evasion, however, because transactions 
normally labeled as sales are now intra-company transfers.174 As follows, 
Colorado no longer requires vertical integration; however, many market 
participants have decided to remain vertically integrated.175 
 
162. Colorado Medical Use of Marijuana, Initiative 20 (2000), BALLOTOPEDIA http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Colorado_Medical_Use_of_Marijuana,_Initiative_20_(2000) (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
163. See Marijuana Taxes/Quick Answers, supra note 157 (summarizing Colorado’s Tax methodology on 
marijuana); Colorado Sales/Use Tax Rates, see also COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE: TAXPAYER SER’V DIV. (Dec. 
2016), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/DR1002.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (listing 
Colorado “sales/use tax rates [on marijuana] throughout the state”) (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review); BRC Report, supra note 10, at 53. 
164. LIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at 15. 
165. Excise 23, supra note 157.  
166. Id. 
167. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 53. 
168. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 87. 
169. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 87 (Describing the intention of Colorado and Washington to 
use their tracking system “to prevent leakage [&] diversion of legally grown product before collection of tax.” 
“The main argument for requiring vertical integration is that, when there is only one company to deal with, 
regulations are easier to administer and taxes are easier to collect”). 
170. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 50. 
171. Id. 
172. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 79. 
173. Id. 
174. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 79; LIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at 20. 
175. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 79; see also LIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at 20–21 (summarizing 
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After a slow start, marijuana sales in Colorado have steadily increased tax 
revenue.176 In 2014, Colorado made a total of $63.4 million in tax revenue.177 The 
following year, Colorado generated $121.1 million in revenue from roughly $1 
billion in marijuana sales.178 In 2016, Colorado generated close to $200 million in 
revenue and nearly $1.3 billion in sales.179 Remarkably, in a study conducted by 
the Marijuana Policy Group (MPG), researchers found that the increase in total 
revenue is primarily driven by consumers transitioning from the illicit to 
recreational market, rather than an increase in overall demand.180 In addition, the 
study found that tourism is also driving the increase in generating revenue from 
cannabis.181 In 2015, “77.7 million visitors who spent an all-time high of $19.1 
billion,” was a nearly 60% percent increase since 2012.182 In that same year, 
Denver’s hotel-room occupancy rate was at 76%, despite the opening of 14 new 
hotels in the metro area.183 Similarly, after Oregon legalized cannabis, 
Washington noticed a decline in sales in counties along the border.184 
Additionally, the black market in Colorado continues to shrink but still takes 
up a share of the market.185 Specifically, roughly 70% of market demand is met 
through legitimate retailers, while the rest is met through gray market suppliers 
(such as the medical market) or the black market.186 In addition, legal but 
unregulated home growing accounted for 9% of the market.187 Moreover, those 
 
the history and current state of vertical integration in Colorado). 
176. See Alicia Wallace, Colorado Cannabis: $1.3 Billion Worth of Marijuana Sold in 2016, THE 
CANNABIST (Feb. 9, 2017, 5:25 PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/02/09/colorado-marijuana-sales-
2016/73415/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (summarizing the steady increase in 
generating revenue since legalization of marijuana in Colorado).  
177. LIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at 4, 18; Marijuana Tax Data, COL. DEP. OF REVENUE, 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/revenue/colorado-marijuana-tax-data (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
178. LIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at 5. 
179. Here’s Where Colorado Spends Its Skyrocketing Pot Tax Revenue, ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/289613 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Wallace, 
supra note 176.  
180. LIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at 6. 
181. Id. at 8. 
182. Jason Blevins, Colorado’s Mountain Resorts Again See Record Spending, DENVER POST (Mar. 10, 
2017), available at http://www.denverpost.com/2017/03/10/colorado-mountain-resorts-record-spending/ (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (Discussing the increase in tourism and spending in Colorado). 
183. Ben Markus, Denver Hotels See A ‘Quite Remarkable’ Year: Occupancy Up as Economy Grows, 
COLO. PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.cpr.org/news/story/denver-hotels-see-quite-remarkable-year-
occupancy-economy-grows (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
184. Id. 
185. CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 10, at 219. 
186. Reeferegulatory Challenge, THE ECONOMIST (Feb 13th 2016), http://www.economist. 
com/news/briefing/21692873-growing-number-countries-are-deciding-ditch-prohibition-what-comes. 
187. LIGHT ET. AL, supra note 20, at 6. 
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who had medical recommendations prior to Colorado legalizing marijuana 
continued to utilize the medical system to avoid paying the extra tax.188 But does 
this revenue make an impact in the state?189 Marijuana is making a small impact 
on the budget, but it is likely too early to tell.190 Falling cannabis prices, 
alongside a greater number of states legalizing, leaves the future of Colorado’s 
tax scheme uncertain.191 MPG predicts that sales in Colorado will slow down as 
the market saturates as more states continue to legalize.192 Thus, it remains 
unclear whether Colorado’s success in generating tax revenue will continue.193 
2. Washington 
In November 2012, Washington passed Initiative 502, legalizing recreational 
marijuana in that state.194 Like Colorado, Washington has also based its model 
for the marijuana industry off of its alcohol model.195 The Liquor and Cannabis 
Board is responsible for overseeing the marijuana regulatory system.196 
Washington voters first legalized medical cannabis in 1998 with the passage of 
Initiative 692.197 
Washington taxes marijuana by percentage of price.198 Initially, Washington 
levied three 25% excise taxes at three different stages of production,199 but issues 
began as soon as the legislature tried to fuse the recreational market and 
unregulated medical system together,200 leading to higher prices and slower 
growth.201 Moreover, participants in the recreational market “complained of 
 
188. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 12, at 228–29. 
189. Id. at 218–219. 
190. Id. at 218–219. 
191. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 218; Jack Kaskey, As Pot Prices Plunge, 
Growers Scramble to Cut Their Costs, DENVER POST (Jan. 21, 2017. 11:07 AM), http://www. 
denverpost.com/2017/01/21/marijuana-prices-plunge-growers-scramble/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
192. LIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at 6.  
193. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 218–19. 
194. Washington Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, Initiative 502 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Marijuana_Legalization_and_Regulation,_ Initiative_502_2012) (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
195. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 217. 
196. Id. 
197. Washington Medical Marijuana, Initiative 692 (1998), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Washington_Medical_Marijuana,_Initiative_692_(1998) (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
198. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 49. 
199. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 77, citing WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535 (West 2015). 
200. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 32; Ogelsby, supra note 27. 
201. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 18. 
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unfair competition by medical dispensaries that were able to provide cheaper 
products [because of lower] tax rates.”202 
Businesses in Washington then began to vertically integrate to evade paying 
the tax at different stages.203 In response, Washington legislators recently passed 
a bill reconciling the medical and recreational markets.204 Now, Washington 
levies a 37% ad valorem excise tax for both medical and recreational 
marijuana.205 The tax is assessed at the point of sale.206 Consequently, this has the 
added benefit of avoiding the federal tax issue under section 280E, and is 
discussed in more detail below.207 In addition, taxes are also assessed at the local 
level on both recreational and medical marijuana.208 However, medical marijuana 
is exempt from the 6.5% state sales tax.209 Moreover, Washington does not allow 
coupons or vertical integration and limits home grown marijuana only to medical 
patients.210 The state also has a track and trace211 system in place, that if working 
as intended, should prevent tax evasion and leakage to other states.212 
 
202. Id. at 55. 
203. Eliza Gray, New Laws Chart Course for Marijuana Legalization, TIME (Oct. 19, 2013), available at 
http://nation.time.com/2013/10/19/new-laws-chart-course-for-marijuana-legalization/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (Discussing the different approaches that Colorado and Washington have 
taken. For example, Colorado requires vertical integration, while Washington prohibits it”). 
204. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535 (West 2015); FAQs on Taxes, WASH. ST. LIQUOR & CANNABIS 
CONTROL BOARD, http://lcb.wa.gov/mj2015/faqs-on-taxes (last visited Aug. 5, 2017) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review); BRC Report, supra note 10, at 55; Rachel La Corte, Washington State 
Pot Law Overhaul: Marijuana Tax Reset at 37%, THE CANNABIST, http://www.thecannabist.co/ 
2015/07/01/washington-state-pot-law-overhaul-marijuana-tax-reset-at-37-percent/37238/ (last visited on Mar. 
13, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
205. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.535 (West 2015); FAQs on Taxes, supra note 204; BRC Report, supra 
note 10, at 55; La Corte, supra note 204. 
206. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 87–88. 
207. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 18 (observing that Washington avoids the 280E issue “by shifting 
the tax to the retail level where the consumer pays). 
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.14.030 (West 2016). 
209. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.08.020(1) (West 2016). 
210. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10 at 217–18; Marijuana Licensing FAQ, WASH. ST. 
LIQUOR & CANNABIS BOARD, http://lcb.wa.gov/mjlicense/mj_licensing_faq (last visited April 19, 2017) (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
211. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 87 ( describing the hope of Colorado and Washington to make 
the track and trace system efficient enough to “turn leakage and late collection into small problems”); see also 
Samantha Young, California Considers Marijuana ‘Track and Trace’ system for Cannabis Industry, GOV’T 
TECH. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.govtech.com/state/California-Considers-Marijuana-Track-and-Trace-
System-for-Cannabis-Industry.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (the “track and 
trace” system in states that have already legalized or have recently legalized, seeks to track cannabis from seed 
to sale to prevent tax evasion by tracking products from the beginning of production to the point of sale). 
212. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 87. 
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In 2014, Washington collected $16 million in excise tax revenue based on 
$49 million in marijuana sales.213 The following year, revenue reached a total of 
$129 million based on $486 million in total sales.214 In 2016, Washington 
generated $255 million in excise tax revenue and eclipsed $1 billion in marijuana 
sales.215 Washington does not limit potency and bans selling alcohol and tobacco 
where cannabis is also sold.216 Like Colorado, tax revenue is making a small 
impact on the budget, but it is likely still too early to tell.217 Like Colorado, 
falling prices and legalization in other states may significantly slow or even halt 
revenue growth in Washington.218 
E. The Road to Legalization in California 
This subpart examines California’s unique history with marijuana, as well as 
its medical and recreational marijuana structures.219 It then discusses California’s 
current medical marijuana regulations.220 Finally, it discusses the new tax scheme 
under Proposition 64 for California’s recreational marijuana market.221 
1. California and Proposition 215 
California’s unique circumstances creates both advantages and challenges to 
regulating a recreational marijuana market.222 For example, California is the most 
populous state in the country, with a population of 38 million people and home to 
some of the nation’s largest cities.223 Further, California is home to a booming 
 
213. See Overview, 502 DATA, https://www.502data.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (on file with The 




216. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 217–18. 
217. See generally CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 10, at 218–19 (discussing the potential tax revenues in 
Colorado and Washington). 
218. Keith Humphreys, So, Something Interesting Happens to Weed After It’s Legal, THE WASH. POST 
(May 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/04/the-price-of-legal-pot-is-
collapsing/?utm_term=.61a8054bccf2 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
219. Infra Part II.E.1. 
220. Infra Part II.E.2. 
221. Infra Part II.E.3. 
222. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 10 (observing that California’s unique circumstances “will 
require cannabis laws and regulations that are specifically tailored to California”).  
223. Id.; see Quick Facts: California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/ 
PST045215/06,00 (last visited Aug. 5, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(summarizing California’s census data). 
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tourism industry with top destinations such as Golden Gate, Half Dome, and 
Hollywood and other attractions.224 But now, as pointed out by the Blue-Ribbon 
Commission, “some tourists will choose to consume cannabis,” which will 
require consideration post-legalization.225 Moreover, California’s constitution and 
political process may create unforeseen challenges.226 There are often difficulties 
in the legislative process that are present, especially in relation to taxation.227 
“Normally, it is more difficult to change laws passed by citizen initiatives than 
laws passed by legislative measures or regulatory decisions.”228 
California is also home to “millions of acres of rural land,” national parks, 
and state parks.229 In other words, the state is ripe to be sewn with seeds of new 
cannabis cultivation for the recreational system.230 And California already has a 
reputation for growing a lot of cannabis.231 A reputation that usually starts and 
ends in the Emerald Triangle.232 The Emerald Triangle is made up of “Humboldt, 
Mendocino, and Trinity, and other rural counties…”233 in Northern California, 
and is home to roughly 30,000 cannabis grow sites.234 There are no sound 
estimates on how much cannabis California grows, but there is agreement that 
California is a major exporter of cannabis.235 Indeed, California’s home grown 
marijuana makes up a significant amount of the cannabis in the black market in 
the United States.236 Most observers are unsure of precisely how much California 
actually consumes; but, NORML (National Organization for Reforming 
Marijuana Laws) estimates, “Californians consume between $870 million and $2 
billion worth of medical marijuana per year.”237 
 
224. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 12. 
225. Id. 
226. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 13 (highlighting the difficulties that the California initiative 
system poses for regulators trying to navigate marijuana policy). 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 10–11. 
230. See Thomas Fuller, Marijuana Goes Industrial in California (Apr. 15, 2017), N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/us/california-marijuana-industry-agriculture.html?_r=0 (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing California’s success in growing other crops is likely to extend 
over to marijuana production).  
231. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 12 (pointing out that California is home to the “nation’s oldest 
medical marijuana industry,” and is “also home to a substantial amount of cannabis cultivation”). 
232. Id. at 11. 
233. Id.  
234. Id. at 12. 
235. Id.  
236. Id. 
237. California’s Billion-Dollar Medical Marijuana Market Offers Millions in Tax Revenues, CAL. 
NORML, http://www.canorml.org/background/OakFinancialReportRelse.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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In 1996, Californians approved Proposition 215238 (Prop. 215) and became 
the first state to legalize medical marijuana.239 Today, the California medical 
industry has evolved and “includes entities involved in cultivation, retail sales, 
testing and many other functions;” but, is largely “unregulated at the state 
level.”240 For better or worse, most Prop. 215 regulations take place at the local 
level.241 For many patients, the medical marijuana system legitimately provides 
the benefit of pain relief; however, many also use the system for recreational 
reasons.242 The California Legislature must work out this issue, along with others, 
to tame the California marijuana market.243 
2. The New Medical Market: The Medical Cannabis Regulation and Safety 
Act (MCRSA) 
In 2015, California passed three bills: AB 243;244 AB 266;245 and SB 643;246 
Together this legislation is known as the Medical Cannabis Regulation and 
Safety Act (MCRSA).247 The law will take effect in 2018, and run 
contemporaneously with the recreational system.248 MCRSA establishes the 
 
238. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996). 
239. California Proposition 215, The Medical Marijuana Initiative (1996), BALLOTPEDIA, https:// 
ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_215,_the_Medical_Marijuana_Initiative_(1996) (last visited Apr. 1, 
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also BRC Report, supra note 10, at 11. 
(pointing out that California has the oldest medical marijuana industry in the nation). 
240. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 12. 
241. Cannabis Regulation, DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFF., BUREAU OF CANNABIS CONTROL PROPOSED 
TRAILER BILL LEGIS. (Apr. 4, 2017), available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/Budget/Trailer_Bill_Language/ 
documents/200CannabisRegulationDraft.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
242. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 12 (observing that medical market has those “dedicated to 
responsible cultivation” and some “have past criminal records associated with their participation in the medical 
marijuana system”).  
243. Id.; see BRC Report, supra note 10, at 10–13 (pointing out that California’s industry, people, land 
and government will present unique challenges for legislatures in approaching the complexities of marijuana 
policy). 
244. AB 243, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
245. AB 266, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
246. SB 643, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016); see generally Bureau of Medical Cannabis 
Regulation, CAL. BUREAU OF MEDICAL REG., http://bmcr.ca.gov/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2017) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
247. Cal NORML: A Summary of The Medical Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MCRSA), CAL. 
NORML, http://www.canorml.org/news/A_SUMMARY_OF_THE_MEDICAL_MARIJUANA_REGULATIO
N_AND_SAFETY_ACT (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
248. Steve Owens, Understanding New California Medical Cannabis Regulatory Environment, NEW 
CANNABIS VENTURES (May 19, 2016), available at https://www.newcannabisventures.com/understanding-new-
california-medical-cannabis-regulatory-environment/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(discussing the impact of the three new laws). 
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regulatory structure and license types that Prop. 64 is based on.249 MCRSA limits 
cultivation licenses for indoor grows to 22,000 square feet, and outdoor grows to 
1 acre.250 Prop. 64 adds Type 5 cultivation licenses, which sets no limit on size, 
but will not be available until 2023.251 
Under AB 266, the Bureau of Medical Cannabis Regulation under the 
Department of Consumer Affairs is the chief regulating agency for the 
recreational and medical markets.252 AB 266 and SB 643 establish the licensing 
framework and cultivation limitation for both the medical and recreational 
market.253 SB 643 and AB 243 assign various agencies duties for regulating 
cannabis.254 For example, the laws require the Department of Food and 
Agriculture to oversee cultivation, and the Department of Public Health oversees 
production and testing.255 Although MCRSA was to be implemented in January 
of 2016, it will be up and running simultaneously with the recreational system in 
2018.256 
Recently, California Governor Jerry Brown, proposed a hotly contested bill 
to reconcile both systems, potentially delaying the first day of marijuana sales.257 
The bill proposes several notable solutions to resolving the conflicts between 
MCRSA and Prop. 64.258 Most notably, it seeks to remove the ban on vertical 
integration under MCRSA.259 
3. Proposition 64: California Legalizes Recreational Marijuana 
Proposition 64 (Prop. 64), also known as the Control, Regulate and Tax 
Adult Use of Marijuana Act (AUMA), legalizes recreational marijuana in 
 
249. Cal NORML: A Summary of The Medical Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act, supra note 247.  
250. AB 243, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (adding to CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §19332(g)). 
251. Cal. Proposition 64 (2017) (adding to CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26061(d)). 
252. AB 266, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016); SB 643, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
253. AB 266, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016); SB 643, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
254. SB 643, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016); AB 243, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) 
(adding to CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §19332(g)). 
255. Cal NORML: A Summary of The Medical Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act, supra note 247. 
256. Bureau of Medical Cannabis Regulation, supra note 246; Owens, supra note 248 (“Regulatory 
agencies have until January 2018 to establish the rules adopted in MMRSA”). 
257. Cannabis Regulation, supra note 241; see Patrick McGreevy, Rift Opens Between the Brown 
Administration and Legislatures Over New Marijuana Laws in California, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-medical-recreational-pot-rules-rift 20170414-story.html (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the political divide surrounding the drafting of 
regulations required to get the new cannabis market off the ground). 
258. Cannabis Regulation, supra note 241.  
259. Id. at 3–4. 
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California for persons 21 years or older.260 Prop. 64’s “regulatory provisions are 
largely patterned on MCRSA.”261 Specifically, AUMA legalizes the sale and 
possession of up to 28.5 grams (one ounce) of marijuana,262 8 grams of 
concentrated cannabis,263 and cultivation of 6 plants for personal use.264 Usually, 
initiatives are not amendable after they are passed in California.265 However, 
Prop. 64 allows the California Legislature, with a majority vote, to amend Prop. 
64 with laws that are consistent with its purpose and intent.266 Playing a 
significant role in the drafting process were the Blue-Ribbon Commission (BRC) 
and the Marijuana Policy Project (MPP).267 Currently, it is legal to possess 
cannabis in California; however, there is no access to a legal source of cannabis 
until January 1, 2018 when retail sales are set to begin.268 
Prop. 64 creates two new excise taxes to be imposed on both medical and 
recreational cannabis.269 First, it enacts a weight-based excise tax on 
cultivation.270 It taxes marijuana at a rate of $9.25 per ounce for flowers,271 and 
$2.75 per ounce for leaves (trim).272 Second, it levies an ad valorem (percentage-
of-price) tax on marijuana purchases at retail.273 It taxes “at the rate of 15 percent 
of the gross receipts of any retail sale.”274 In addition, Prop. 64 emphasizes that 
the tax on marijuana applies fully to any purchase that contains both 1) marijuana 
 
260. California Proposition 64, Marijuana Legalization (2016), supra note 6. 
261. California NORML Guide to AUMA, CAL. NORML http://www.canorml.org/Cal_NORML_ 
Guide_to_AUMA (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
262. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1(a)(1) (enacted by Cal. Prop. 64, approved Nov. 8, 2016, 
eff. Nov. 9, 2016). 
263. Id. § 11362.1(a)(2).  
264. Id. § 11362.1(a)(3). 
265. See Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the Shortcomings of Direct 
Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 707, 710–13 (1998) (observing that the typical legislative process involves 
amendments to “avoid ambiguity and accommodate competing voices,” while the initiative process is severely 
limited in how much an initiative can be amended by the voters). 
266. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26000(a) (enacted by Cal. Prop. 64, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff. Nov. 9, 
2016). 
267. Vitiello, supra note 19. 
268. Katy Steinmetz, What to Know About Marijuana Legalization in California, TIME (Nov. 9, 2016), 
http://time.com/4565438/california-marijuana-faq-rules-prop-64/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
269. See Oglesby, supra note 27 (summarizing California’s approach to taxing cannabis). 
270. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 34012(a) (enacted by Cal. Prop. 64, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff. Nov. 9, 
2016). 
271. Id. § 34012(a)(1). 
272. Id. § 34012(a)(2). 
273. Id. § 34011(a). 
274. Id. 
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products and 2) other discrete items.275 In effect, “this prevents… bundling as a 
tax evasion scheme.”276 Additionally, medical marijuana is subject to an 
exemption from the 7.5% state sales tax.277 In 2020, Prop. 64 will give the Board 
of Equalization (Board) authority to adjust the ad valorem excise tax for 
inflation.278 The Board is responsible for administering and collecting the tax.279 
Currently, Prop. 64 gives the Board broad authority to change the tax level, or tax 
base, or broaden the tax to include other categories of cannabis.280 Prop.64 
requires proof payment through “tax stamps or state-issued product bags,” which 
the state’s “track and trace program” can scan and trace.281 Prop. 64 also sets 
certain sanctions for tax evasion.282 If a person fails to pay the required tax, the 
state may compel them pay any outstanding debt.283 The state, additionally, may 
sanction them for half the amount owed or potentially revoke their license.284 Tax 
revenue, fines, licensing fees and other revenue streams will be deposited in the 
California Marijuana Tax Fund.285 
Commentators predict the California recreational market to be the biggest 
yet.286 Prop. 64’s drafters and proponents of the measure predict that the new 
recreational cannabis market will generate millions of dollars in revenue needed 
to cover the costs of the new law and provide funding to the various groups.287 
Further, the state analyst predicts the recreational market will generate “tax 
revenue that will start of in the millions, eventually reaching $1 billion; including 
millions in revenue for local governments.288 Factors that could vary the 
measure’s intended fiscal effects are: (1) local government regulations; (2) the 
 
275. Id. § 34011(b).  
276. Oglesby, supra note 27. 
277. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 34012(j) (enacted by Cal. Prop. 64, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff. Nov. 9, 
2016) (allowing exemption for qualified patient or care giver under “§ 11362.1 of the Health and Safety Code 
… in accordance with the Compassionate Use Act”). 
278. Id. § 34012(k). 
279. Id. § 34013(a). 
280. Id. § 34013(d). 
281. Id. § 34102(e)–(g). 
282. Id. § 34013(e), 
283. Id. § 34013(e). 
284. Id.  
285. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 17, at 8. 
286. See Thomas Fuller, Marijuana Goes Industrial In California, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/us/california-marijuana-industry-agriculture.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (pointing out that California’s reputation as an agricultural state for 
producing fruits and vegetables will likely reflect the size of its new marijuana market). 
287. Cal. Proposition 64 § 2 (2016) (Findings and Declarations); see California Proposition 64, 
Marijuana Legalization (2016), supra note 6. 
288. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 17, at 1. 
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federal government; and (3) variance in marijuana price and consumption.289 
Arcview group, a leading investment and market research firm in the cannabis 
industry, estimates “[l]egal cannabis sales in California could be worth about 
$6.2 billion in five years.”290 Further, California NORML estimates the state 
could generate tax revenue up to $1.5–$2.5 billion per year.291 Finally, a recent 
study conducted by the University of the Pacific’s Center for Business and Policy 
Research predicts, “a legal cannabis industry that creates over 20,000 jobs and 
$4.2 billion in total annual economic output in the Sacramento region alone.”292 
One example of the California cannabis industry’s potential is Steve Deangelo, 
the owner of several prominent dispensaries in the Oakland area and co-owner of 
the Arcview group.293 Mr. Deangelo averages $44 million in sales annually, and 
runs FLRish Inc., a marijuana venture backed by Silicon Valley investors.294 
Further, some observers state that, “in California, there are more than 20 ventures 
seeking large-scale commercial growing permits, and officials predict pot 
agriculture could bring in $20 million to $30 million annually in new tax 
revenues.”295 
Potential savings are cited as another source of revenue.296 Some claim that 
legalization would save $8 billion to $16 billion in taxes, “not counting the 
economic benefits of hemp agriculture and other spinoff industries.”297 Savings 
on incarceration and other criminal justice costs underlie this argument. 298 But, 
this also depends on several key variables in the legal market, such as the 
“reduction in criminal justice costs, the effect on public health and the amount of 
money spent regulating cannabis.”299 
 
289. Id. 
290. Zusha Elinson, California’s Next Buzzy Varietal May Not Come From Grapes, WALL STREET 
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Ending Cannabis Prohibition, NORML (June 1994), http://norml.org/component/zoo/category/economics-of-
cannabis-legalization (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
292. Daniel Conway, Cannabis Can Go From Conundrum to Catalyst, COMSTOCK’S (Feb. 27, 2017), 
http://www.comstocksmag.com/commentary/cannabis-can-go-conundrum-catalyst (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
293. Peter Hecht, The Other Side of Eden: Commercial Marijuana Takes Root in Steinbeck Country, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 26, 2017 4:00 PST), http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/california-
weed/article140700623.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
294. Id. 
295. Id. 
296. See Vitiello, supra note 51, at 1373–75 (observing that proponents often cite saved enforcement 
costs as part of their argument for legalization of marijuana). 
297. Gieringer, supra note 291.  
298. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 17 at 12–13. 
299. Id.; see also Vitiello, supra note 51, at 1350 (opponent’s do not believe there will be any “significant 
 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49 
181 
Assuming a recreational market generates revenue, how will this money get 
spent?300 Initially, California legislators will use tax revenue to cover 
administrative costs not covered by licensing fees.301 The money is then allocated 
amongst various groups for different purposes.302 First, the marijuana tax revenue 
will fund $10 to $50 million for social services in communities harmed by the 
War on Drugs. 303 In 2018, the tax revenue will fund $10 million and then 
increase by $10 million each year thereafter.304 Second, from 2018 to 2029, the 
fund will allocate $10 million to evaluate the measures effect.305 Next, from 2018 
to 2029, the fund will allocate $3 million annually to develop a detection system 
for driving under the influence of cannabis.306 Then, the fund will allocate $2 
million for medical marijuana research.307 Finally, the fund will distribute 
leftover money: (1) 60 percent to youth programs; (2) 20 percent to cover the 
costs of environmental harm from illegal marijuana grows; and (3) 20 percent for 
safety programs, including driving under the influence of cannabis.308 
III. PERCOLATING ISSUES UNDER PROPOSITION 64 
This Part first examines the potential issues that may manifest under 
Proposition 64’s tax structure.309 Then, it considers potential concerns in 
collecting and enforcing the marijuana tax in California.310 Finally, it examines 
how federal law may impact the amount of revenue generated from the 
recreational market in California.311 
  
 
reduction in prison costs or significant increases in revenue”). 
300. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 17 at 8–9 (stating how the revenue generated from 
marijuana will be spent). 
301. See id. (stating how the revenue generated from marijuana will be spent). 
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A. Potential Issues Under Prop 64’s Tax Structure 
The sweet spot for taxing cannabis is elusive.312 If the tax is too low the state 
will not be able to achieve optimal revenue; but if the tax is too high, the market 
may be polarized towards illegal sales, along with all the potential revenue.313 
Naturally, marijuana will be taxed at a higher rate than other goods; but, a tax too 
high can amount to de facto prohibition.314 High cultivation taxes can also have 
the unintended effect of blocking access to small producers and allow corporate 
takeover of the industry.315 Indeed, a sound tax base and level are the crux of 
having an efficient cannabis tax policy.316 
Prop. 64 levies an ad valorem (percentage-of-price) tax on marijuana 
purchases at retail.317 It taxes at the rate of “15 percent of the gross receipts of 
any retail sale.”318 In addition, it emphasizes that the tax on marijuana applies 
fully to any purchase that contains both (1) marijuana products and (2) other 
discrete items.319 This prevents “bundling as a tax evasion scheme.”320 Still, 
several problems may emerge with ad valorem taxes under Prop 64.321 
First, it is important for California legislatures to consider marijuana prices 
when they determine the soundness of California’s 15 percent excise tax.322 That 
is because this type of tax base “amplifies change in pretax price 
automatically.”323 Prices, therefore, may largely depend on the type of cannabis 
economy that emerges.324 Optimistic progressives foresee a marijuana market 
that is a weed lover’s gourmet of high-quality organic products; cynics predict 
 
312. See Oglesby, supra note 27 (observing that “even the soundest tax structure” will not guarantee 
fiscal success for proposition 64”) 
313. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 54. 
314. Miron, supra note 1, at 447, 449. 
315. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 54. 
316. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 776 (highlighting the importance of deciding taxations levels, 
goals and how to actually tax marijuana). 
317. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 34011(a) (enacted by Cal. Prop. 64, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff. Nov. 9, 
2016). 
318. Id.  
319. Id. §34011(b). 
320. See Oglesby, supra note 27; see also BRC Report, supra note 10, at 49–51 (discussing the difficulty 
of determining the actual price of cannabis). 
321. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78 (pointing out that a price based tax has the potential to make 
marijuana prices too high or too low because it “amplifies changes in pretax price automatically”); see also 
BRC Report, supra note 10, at 49–51 (discussing the difficulty of determining the actual price of cannabis). 
322. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78 (observing that if the price of marijuana is too high or low, 
a price based tax will make is significantly higher or lower than the original pretax price”); see also BRC 
Report, supra note 10, at 49–51 (discussing the difficulty of determining the actual price of cannabis). 
323. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78. 
324. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 148–49. 
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the good stuff (high quality marijuana) will be reserved for the bourgeoisie, while 
the general public consume mass-produced, lower-quality products.325 Still, no 
one knows precisely what kind of market will emerge.326 
Regardless of the marijuana industry that emerges, most scholars agree that 
after a state legalizes cannabis, the price will likely start high, and then steadily 
decline.327 For example, when legalization first took effect in Colorado and 
Washington, the industry struggled to keep up with consumer demand, which 
resulted in high prices.328 Because ad valorem taxes magnified the cost of 
marijuana, the black and medical markets retain a share of the market in those 
states.329 Hence, when California gears up for legal sales, it may incur sizable 
start-up costs, which if combined with a cannabis supply shortage, will cause the 
price of cannabis to sky rocket.330 The one caveat to this would be if California 
had a high demand for reasonably priced legal cannabis initially, a higher tax 
may prove successful.331 
Plausibly, California’s unique circumstances could make low initial costs a 
significant challenge.332 First, California is a significantly larger state 
geographically and in population.333 Consequently, this makes getting the 
industry off the ground a big challenge.334 Adding to this, California’s large and 
loosely regulated medical industry may complicate pricing scenarios even 
further.335 Like California, Washington also had a largely unregulated medical 
market.336 This lead to a situation where medical dispensaries threatened to 
undermine the legal market by providing cheaper products with less taxes.337 
Thus, the California’s recreational market, like other states, will likely experience 
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336. Id. at 32. 
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higher cannabis prices at first.338 Nevertheless, as the industry evolves, lower 
production costs will drive down the cost of cannabis for the consumer.339 As was 
the case in Colorado and Washington, where both states experienced a significant 
price drop.340 Because an ad valorem tax contains no price floor, a price collapse 
would significantly reduce revenue.341 However, this result comes with the 
advantage of lower prices that could curb the presence of a black market.342 
Basing estimates on cannabis prices in Colorado and Washington today comes 
with several limitations.343 Specifically, national legalization could significantly 
alter the cannabis pricing scenario, and current federal policy is subject to 
constant change.344 
Selecting the appropriate taxation level is equally important when 
considering cannabis prices.345 The ability to maintain high state taxes becomes 
difficult if neighboring states have lower taxes because of the ease of transport 
across state lines.346 That is, tax prices may tempt individuals to buy in a low-tax 
state and resell in a high-tax state.347 Since Nevada, Colorado, Oregon, and 
Washington are all located near California, it may be important to keep tax prices 
relative to those states.348 Further, comparing the taxation level that California 
 
338. See Dennis Romero, Pot Prices Could Actually Rise After Legalization, LA WEEKLY (Nov. 4, 2016, 
6:49 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/pot-prices-could-actually-rise-after-legalization-7575349 (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (citing inventory, compliance with laws, demand, testing and 
experiences of other states as all possible variables that may contribute to an increase in the price of marijuana). 
339. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 49–50. 
340. Keith Humphreys, Falling Prices Mean Trouble for States That Have Legalized Marijuana, THE 
CANNABIST (Jan. 18, 2017, 12:20 PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/01/18/marijuana-price-drops-state-
revenue/71657/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
341. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 77, 78 (indicating that a weight-based tax provides more stable 
revenue than a price base; and pointing out that if the pretax price is too low, a price based tax could push the 
price of marijuana down to levels that are dangerous for an industry in its infancy); see also BRC Report, supra 
note 10, at 50 (observing that if the price of marijuana falls the revenue brought in by a price based tax would 
drop alongside it; while a weight based tax can create a “floor under the market”); Oglesby, supra note 27 
(pointing out that “an indexed tab based on observable weight is inherently flexible and should survive a price 
collapse”). 
342. Cf., BRC Report, supra note 10, at 49 (observing that when prices are too high, prices in the black-
market may seem more attractive for consumers). 
343. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 140. 
344. Id. at 140–41. 
345. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 54 (predicting that when a tax rate is too high it may polarize 
consumers to the black market, while a tax rate to low may cause greater access to youth and problem users). 
346. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 258–59. 
347. Id.  
348. Alicia Wallace, Where Is Weed Legal? Map of U.S. Marijuana Laws by State, THE CANNABIST (Oct. 
14, 2016, 12:59 PM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2016/10/14/legal-marijuana-laws-by-state-map-united-
states/62772/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing a map of states that have 
legalized marijuana). 
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assessed to levels in Washington and Colorado may provide useful insight into 
California’s policy.349 In addition to the 15% excise tax, California levies a 7.5% 
sales tax and local taxes at purchase.350 In comparison, Colorado levies a “2.9% 
state sales tax,351 10% marijuana tax[,] and any local sales taxes.”352 Meanwhile, 
Washington currently imposes a 37% excise tax, which the state assesses at the 
point of the sale353 alongside any additional state sales and local taxes.354 
There are several notable differences between the taxing schemes in 
Washington, Colorado, and California.355 Besides being 5% higher, one 
important distinction between California’s 15% tax rate and Colorado’s 10% tax 
rate is that California includes the excise tax and sales tax at the point of 
purchase.356 Currently, there is a bill in the Colorado legislature to lower the tax 
to 8%, to help the recreational market undercut the black market, but recently the 
bill has been postponed indefinitely.357 While Washington maintains a 
significantly higher retail tax, having one collection point compensates for the 
higher price.358 So, the comparison between the taxation levels turns on the 
viability of tax collection points.359 
In addition, as some scholars have pointed out, the excise taxes in 
Washington and Colorado are too high and fail to optimize revenue in those 
states.360 Similarly, the tax in California is high even without considering the 
second excise tax California levies on producers.361 Thus, because the level of tax 
 
349. BRC Report, supra note 10, at iv. 
350. Ben Adlin, California Moving Quickly to Tax Medical Cannabis, LEAFLY, https://www.leafly. 
com/news/politics/california-moving-quickly-to-tax-medical-cannabis (last visited on July 31, 2017) (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
351. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-106(1)(a)(II) (2015). 
352. Marijuana Taxes/Quick Answers, supra note 157. 
353. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 55. 
354. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.14.030 (West 2015). 
355. See Oglesby, supra note 27 (comparing proposition 64 to Washington and Colorado’s marijuana tax 
regime). 
356. See What Is an Excise Tax and How Does it Differ From Sales Tax?, ACCURATE TAX (Sept. 10, 
2015), https://www.accuratetax.com/blog/what-is-excise-tax-and-how-does-it-differ-from-sales-tax/ (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the difference between a sales tax and an excise 
tax). 
357. H.R. 17-1345, 71st Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017) (Retail Marijuana Sales Tax) (scheduled to 
take effect July 1, 2017). 
358. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 18 (highlighting the fact that with one collection point 
Washington has a “one time tax”). 
359. Infra Part III.B. 
360. Jeremy P. Gove, Colorado and Washington Got Too High: The Argument for Lower Recreational 
Marijuana Excise Taxes, 19 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 67, 68 (2016). 
361. See Patrick McGreevy, Taxes Get Higher on Newly Legalized Pot as California Cities and Counties 
Move to Make Their Own Cut, LA TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016, 12:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-
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in Colorado and Washington has failed to reduce the illicit market, a higher or 
similar tax rate in California is likely to do the same, or worse.362  
In addition, Prop. 64 enacts a weight-based excise tax on cultivation.363 
Colorado assesses a similar tax and offers a useful comparison.364 It taxes 
marijuana at a rate of $9.25 per ounce for flowers,365 and $2.75 per ounce for 
leaves (trim).366 Meanwhile, Colorado calculates their cultivator excise tax by 
taking the average market weight (AMW) of the cannabis product and 
multiplying it by the 15% excise tax.367 At the time of this writing, rates for the 
period of January 1, 2017 to June 30 2017 are $ 1,471 per pound of flower and 
$499 per pound of trim.368 If a cultivator sold one pound at the AMW, and 
multiplied that price by the 15% excise tax, then the tax owed for the marijuana 
flower would be $221.369 Thus, when selling one pound of marijuana in 
Colorado, the tax rate per ounce of flour would be around $14, which is 
significantly higher than the $9.25 tax in California.370 If a Colorado cultivator 
sold a pound of trim at AMW, they would pay $75 total in taxes, which is nearly 
$4.67 in taxes per ounce.371 Notably, even though California has generally a 
lower tax rate on cultivation when compared to Colorado, the cannabis industry 
in California is already feeling the heat from the new tax regime.372 
Some market participants oppose the tax structure because they find two 
excise taxes, in addition to state and local taxes, to be excessive.373 For example, 
 
ca-pot-legalization-local-taxes-snap-20161118-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (discussing the cloud of concern hovering over the cost of marijuana as “cities and counties pile their 
own taxes of up to 15% on top of the 15% state excise tax approved by voters”). 
362. Cf. Gove, supra note 361 (arguing that high excise taxes in Colorado and Washington act “as a high 
barrier to entry” and help to perpetuate the black market). 
363. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 34012(a) (enacted by Cal. Prop. 64, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff. Nov. 9, 
2016). 
364. Id. §§ 34012(a)(1), 34012(a)(2). 
365. Id. § 34012(a)(1).  
366. Id. § 34012(a)(2). 
367. See Marijuana Taxes/Quick Answers, supra note 157 (explaining that excise tax is calculated by 
multiplying the quantity of retail marijuana product by the average market rate at the time, then multiplying by 
the 15% excise tax rate). 
368. Id.  
369. $1,471 x .15 = $220.65 in taxes for one pound of flower. 
370. $220.65/16= $13.79. 
371. $499 x .15=$ 74.85. 
372. See McGreevy, supra note 362 (discussing the cloud of concern hovering over the cost of marijuana 
as “cities and counties pile their own taxes of up to 15% on top of the 15% state excise tax approved by 
voters”). 
373. See id. (discussing the pushback from the industry with rising cost of entry into the marijuana 
market). 
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NORML, a marijuana policy reform group, has labeled the tax as burdensome.374 
Although California’s excise tax of 15% is not too high, or low, when compared 
to other states.375 Some people, though, believe the best tax policy moving 
forward would start low and steadily increase. 376 
B. Issues of Tax Enforcement and Collection Under Prop. 64 
Taxing cannabis also seeks to modify behavior; anytime a tax modifies 
behavior, it requires enforcement.377 The alcohol and tobacco industries industry 
spend billions annually to fight tax evasion.378 Nevertheless, some portion of 
marijuana tax evasion will always occur.379 As discussed above, some argue the 
end of prohibition means the end of enforcement costs.380 They reason that 
because the government will not need to spend money on arrests, the cost of 
enforcement will likely go down.381 When trying to achieve maximum revenue in 
a marijuana economy, however, cannabis taxes would still require enforcement to 
eliminate the black market and illegal grows.382 
Intuitively, the more enforcement required, the more expensive enforcement 
becomes, and the cost of enforcing California’s regulations will be great.383 Some 
observers estimate there are 50,000 marijuana growers supplying the black 
market in California, which is “six times the number of wineries in the whole 
country.”384 The State Board of Equalization “estimates there are 1,700 
dispensaries in the state.”385 There are also concerns about possible violence 
 
374. See id. (predicting a strong presence of the black market because the excise tax levied by proposition 
64 is too high). 
375. See Ogelsby, supra note 27. 
376. Id. 
377. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 138–39. 
378. Id. 
379. Mikos, supra note 60, at 239. 
380. MIRON, supra note 1, at 447. 
381. Id. 
382. See Vitiello, supra note 19, at 799 (discussing how much additional tax revenue depends on “many 
variables, including methods of implementation of Marijuana laws”). 
383. Id.; With Marijuana Legalized, California Plans How to Collect Taxes, SACRAMENTO CBS (Nov. 
30, 2016, 3:36 PM), http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2016/11/30/with-marijuana-legalized-california-plans-how-
to-collect-taxes/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
384. Joel Warner, California’s Looking For New Tax Revenue? Weed ‘Em and Reap, WIRED (Mar. 3, 
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/californias-looking-new-tax-revenue-weed-em-reap/ (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
385. With Marijuana Legalized, California Plans How to Collect Taxes, supra note 384. 
 
2017 / Will California Realize the Fiscal Benefits of Cannabis Legalization? 
188 
against tax collectors and officials who investigate illegal grows.386 Indeed, tax 
collectors will have a lot of work ahead of them.387 
But how much will it cost to enforce the new marijuana laws in California?388 
In 2017, Governor Jerry Brown allocated 52.2 million for the regulation of 
cannabis, California, however, already loaned money to the agencies during the 
pre-regulation period.389 Further, the State Board of Equalization admitted they 
would need to revise their financial estimates soon.390 Moreover, the industry 
criticized the budget for falling short of the amount required to get regulations off 
the ground.391 In short, the cost of enforcement is likely to be significantly more 
than initially expected.392 
Determining the proper point to collet marijuana taxes is important for 
minimizing enforcement costs.393 Prop. 64 collects the excise taxes at two 
points.394 First, Prop. 64 levies an ad valorem (percentage-of-price) tax on 
marijuana purchases at retail.395 In addition, under Prop. 64, both excise taxes 
would be included in the price when local and state taxes are assessed.396 Because 
the price of marijuana increases as it moves down the supply chain, collecting ad 
ad valorem tax at this stage increases revenue.397 Also, taxing later in the supply 
chain means lower costs for consumer because distributors will usually add to the 
cost, “including the cost of taxes.” 398 Thus, implementing the tax at this stage 
would be effective in preventing the growth of the black market.399 
 
386. Id. 
387. See id. (discussing the years it may take to work out issues in the system). 
388. See id. (identifying a need for more funding in order to effectively enforce marijuana regulations in 
California). 
389. Patrick McGreevy, Governor Brown’s Budget Includes $52.2 Million for Marijuana Regulation 
Under New System, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017, 3:42 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-
essential-politics-updates-gov-brown-s-budget-includes-for-1484090982-htmlstory.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
390. With Marijuana Legalized, California Plans How to Collect Taxes, supra note 384. 
391. Id.  
392. See id. (identifying a need for more funding in order to effectively enforce marijuana regulations in 
California). 
393. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 87 (arguing that tax enforcement will be cheaper as a whole if 
collected at a choke point where a smaller amount of market participants are paying). 
394. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 34011(a), 34012(a) (enacted by Cal. Prop. 64, approved Nov. 8, 2016, 
eff. Nov. 9, 2016). 
395. Id. § 34011(a).  
396. Id. at § 34011(e). 
397. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 53 (“For instance, a 20% retail tax will collect more revenue than a 
20% production tax, since the retail price is normally higher than the production price”). 
398. Id. 
399. See id. at 54 (observing how lower consumer prices allows the legal market to compete with illicit 
one). 
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Second, it assesses a weight-based excise tax on cultivation.400 Because 
California is the largest exporter of cannabis in the United States, collecting at 
this point would help stop leakage and keep revenue in the state.401 In addition, 
because it is a weight-based tax, it shields incoming revenue from a potential 
price collapse.402 But weight-based taxes are more complex, take longer to set up, 
and must consider inflation.403 Moreover, issues that arise under federal law may 
also increase California’s problem of high taxes and high prices when 
legalization occurs.404enforcement.405 Additionally, because the weight-based tax 
separates cannabis into two distinct types, bud and trim, the potential for tax 
evasion increases.406 Naturally, those paying the tax may try to label their 
product, which would be taxed at a higher rate, as trim (which is the lower 
rate).407 Distributors could also make their product extra strong to evade paying 
taxes.408 
In addition, the state’s ability to observe the market is important for 
successful tax collection.409 But the potential size of California’s market could 
easily burden regulators.410 To aid in overseeing the industry, the state is 
implementing a track and trace system, that will track each plant from the point 
of origin to point of sale.411 But the feasibility of such a system is still up in the 
air.412 Although, two collection points will help with this problem because it will 
 
400. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 34012(a) (enacted by Cal. Prop. 64, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff. Nov. 9, 
2016). 
401. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 55. 
402. See id. at 50 (observing that marijuana revenue will still be generated with a weight base tax “even 
in the event of marijuana price collapse”); see also KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 77 (indicating that a weight 
base excise tax “provides more stable revenue than a price base”); see also Oglesby, supra note 27 (pointing out 
that “an indexed tab based on observable weight is inherently flexible and should survive). 
403. Oglesby, supra note 27. 
404. Mikos, supra note 60, at 226–27. 
405. See Mikos, supra note 60, at 226–27 (arguing that tax proponents do not consider the issue of federal 
law when considering the amount of revenue that will be generated from the tax). 
406. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 83 (identifying the issue of “sellers . . . [having] an incentive to 
put bud, normally more potent than trim, into the trim pile”). 
407. Id. 
408. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 136; KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 83; see 
also BRC Report, supra note 10, at 50 (discussing the incentive producers would have to increase the potency 
of their product to receive a higher return without paying the tax). 
409. Mikos, supra note 60, at 239. 
410. Id. at 226–27. 
411. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 34012(g) (enacted by Cal. Prop. 64, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff. Nov. 9, 
2016). 
412. Meadow, Tracking $16+ Billion of Cannabis in California: The Solution, MEADOW (May 15, 2016), 
https://blog.getmeadow.com/tracking-16-billion-of-cannabis-in-california-the-solution-f0f200385ea3 (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
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allow regulators more oversight, it still may not be enough.413 This is where the 
recent discussion on vertical integration plays a role in tax policy in California.414 
Recently, Governor Brown’s reconciliation proposal suggested removing the ban 
on vertical integration under MCRSA.415 Vertical Integration means “what 
different licenses the same entity can have in the supply chain.”416 Consequently, 
regulators would not have to oversee as many businesses. 417 However, vertical 
integration allows businesses to circumvent different tax stages, like in Colorado 
and Washington.418 But, as the BRC pointed out, it is important to “set limits on 
vertical integration” to minimize the negative consequences that may come with 
a corporate take-over of the marijuana industry. 419  
C. The Federal Government’s Effect on Revenue in California 
California does not have to wait until legalization to know what a buzzkill420 
the federal government can be.421 If someone pays their taxes under state law, 
nothing stops Uncle Sam from taking all that information, turning around, and 
putting the tax payer in prison.422 
  
 
413. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 54 (suggesting three collection points at cultivation, processing 
and sales, and recommending that the more check points there are the less likely tax evasion will occur). 
414. See id. (suggesting three collection points at cultivation, processing and sales, and recommending 
that the more check points there are the less likely tax evasion will occur). 
415. Cannabis Regulation, supra note 241, at 5.  
416. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 28. 
417. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 79 (discussing the issue of no transfer occurring when one 
company “transfers to themselves”). 
418. Id. 
419. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 28. 
420. Buzzkill, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=buzzkill, (last 
visited May 11, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining a buzzkill is something 
that spoils or ruins an otherwise enjoyable event). 
421. See Patrick McGreevy, California Officials and the Marijuana Industry Prepare to Fight a Federal 
Crackdown, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2017, 12:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-la-pol-ca-federal-pot-
crackdown-response-20170225-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (observing 
the problems that may arise with conflicts between federal and state law).  
422. Mikos, supra note 60, at 258–59 (pointing out that the federal government could use state data on 
marijuana sales and distribution to help enforce the federal ban). 
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Just ask California’s medical industry, which has dealt with this problem 
since 1996.423 That fear resulted in a large chunk of the market going 
underground and sales going off the books.424 Fear of expanding business and 
attracting too much attention forced the medical industry into small, fragmented 
parts.425 Consequently, these difficulties will likely persist in the recreational 
market, either from old habits, or new enforcement.426 But even if Jeff Sessions 
did not charge a single Californian under the CSA, problems still exist.427 
First, there is the issue with banks.428 Because banks block market 
participants from many banking services, participants must increase security and 
carry around cash in large duffel bag.429 With cash and expensive product on 
hand, many businesses are like sitting ducks, waiting to get robbed.430 In 
addition, state regulators face the problem of accepting all-cash payments on Tax 
Day.431 For example, one owner “deposited a $400,00 payment… in ‘a big bag’” 
while other reports have found payments as large as $30,000 or $150,000.432 The 
Board reported receiving envelopes that do not fit through the teller windows and 
stacking cash around the office when there is no room in the safes.433 The Board 
is attempting to figure out how to approach the issue of large cash payments, and 
this must be done fast.434 Receiving larger cash payments will likely result in 
 
423. See California’s Billion-Dollar Medical Marijuana Market Offers Millions in Tax Revenues, supra 
note 237 (highlighting how federal penalties force cultivators to “operate underground completely unregulated 
and untaxed”). 
424. See id. (highlighting how federal penalties force cultivators to “operate underground completely 
unregulated and untaxed). 
425. Mikos, supra note 60, at 256. 
426. See, Mikos, supra note 60, at 258 (arguing that the federal ban makes monitoring marijuana in 
California difficult, and “to detect tax evasion, California would need adopt costly enforcement measures that 
may not yield positive returns”). 
427. See generally Elizabeth McErlean, Comment, The Real Green Issue Regarding Recreational 
Marijuana: Federal Tax and Banking Laws in Need of Reform, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 1079, 1098–99 (analyzing 
how the issues of banking and tax as being a threat to the legal marijuana system’s viability). 
428. Id. 
429. See id. at 1103–04 (pointing out that dispensary owners “are forced to operate like drug dealers-cash 
only” and are forced to take increased security measures as a result). 
430. See Chemerinsky et. al., supra note 55, at 91 (highlighting the safety concerns of keeping “large 
quantities of cash on hand”). 
431. Anita Chabria, Cash-Only Marijuana Dispensaries Flood California Tax Office with Paper, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2016, 7:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/16/medical-marijuana-
dispensaries-california-tax-cash-only (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
432. Id.  
433. Id. 
434. See With Marijuana Legalized, California Plans How to Collect Taxes, supra note 384 (identifying a 
need for more funding in order to effectively enforce marijuana regulations in California). 
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difficulties counting and storing the money.435 It is hard to imagine that 
individuals would not misplace money or make accounting errors.436 
But, some legislatures are beginning to think creatively about the problem.437 
In Washington, legislators proposed that a bank could work if the “state, rather 
than the [FDIC], would guarantee deposits, providing additional protections from 
federal seizure,” while banks returned profits from the state.438 In 2014, the 
FinCEN guidance slightly loosened the restrictions on banking for the cannabis 
industry; but the effect remains to be seen, especially with the new 
administration.439 Notably, California is already brainstorming ideas to deal with 
the issues under Federal law.440 For instance, Assembly Bill 1578441 prevents 
local authorities from working with federal agents.442 Further, groups of 
cultivators and state officials met to brainstorm ideas on how to provide banking 
services to the industry.443 They discussed the idea of gathering community 
support for developing a non-profit financial institution.444  
Second, Federal Tax Code section 280E treats legal and illegal drugs the 
same.445 This is a major threat to industry profits because “individuals involved 
in the sale of controlled substances, including legalized marijuana, cannot deduct 
standard business expenses on their federal income taxes.”446 Notably, in 2011, 
 
435. See James Rufus Koren, Why Some Pot Businesses Hide Their Cash—And Others Truck It Straight 
To A Federal Vault, L.A. TIMES (July 17, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-cannabis-banking-
20170707-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing how some dispensary 
owners burry their cash in the backyard, while the city of LA had to purchase new cash counting machines 
because “office workers were spending so much time counting and recounting cash tax payments from 
marijuana businesses”). 
436. See id. (discussing how some dispensary owners burry their cash in the backyard, while the city of 
LA had to purchase new cash counting machines because “office workers were spending so much time counting 
and recounting cash tax payments from marijuana businesses”). 
437. See McErlean, supra note 428, at 1113 (noting that “a group of state lawmakers in Washington, 
unsure of the current prospects for federal legalization, proposed the establishment of a state bank that would 
deal with all marijuana business”). 
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439. Id. at 1093–94. 
440. California Strikes Back: Proposed Law Bans Locals from Working with Feds on Pot Crack Down, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/292951 (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting new legislation that would prevent local law enforcement from working 
with federal officials in enforcing federal marijuana law). 
441. AB 1578, 2017–2018, Regular Session (Cal. 2017). 
442. California Strikes Back, supra note 441. 
443. Peter Hecht, Amid California’s Pot Business Boom, Most Banks Run Away From All That Cash, 
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444. Id. 
445. I.R.C. § 280E (2006), as cited in McErlean, supra note 422, at 1107–08. 
446. I.R.C. § 280E (2006), as cited in McErlean, supra note 422, at 1107. 
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the IRS claimed that Harborside Health Center, a dispensary in Oakland, “owed 
millions in taxes under the application of section 280E.”447 Steve Deangelo, 
owner of Harborside, stated, “[n]o business, including Harborside, could survive 
if it's taxed on its gross revenue.”448 Indeed, 280E presents a threat to the entire 
marijuana industry.449 
One way California could avoid the 280E problem altogether is by following 
Washington’s lead.450 In Washington, the 280E issue has been resolved “…by 
keeping the state tax separate from federal taxable income for businesses and 
shifting it to consumers[.]”451 As noted by the RAND study: a “state can choose a 
collection mechanism that will reduce federal income taxes on marijuana 
businesses.”452 One way of relieving the federal tax burden on marijuana is for a 
state to “structure any excise tax (on any base) to apply to the privilege of 
growing or doing business or to production rather than sale.” 453 But, this comes 
with its own disadvantages, and so the industry and state must determine how to 
address this issue.454 
IV. “AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION-IS WORTH A POUND OF CURE” 
As pointed out by the RAND Study; no matter what policy is chosen, it “will 
not fit for long.”455 Indeed, the “industry will evolve in unpredictable ways,”456 
and the law will need to be continuously revised and changed.457 This section 
examines potentially overlooked tax bases and identifies areas that may present a 
risk to the expected revenue goals under Proposition 64.458 Then, it evaluates the 
policy implications of a tax scheme that minimizes risk by focusing on long-term 
returns, as noted in the RAND study.459 
 
447. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 55, at 94. 
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454. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 87 (noting that the state must decide where the tax will be 
collected; see also BRC Report, supra note 11, at 10 (observing that California’s unique circumstances “will 
require cannabis laws and regulations that are specifically tailored to California”). 
455. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 88. 
456. Id. 
457. Id. 
458. Infra Part IV.A. 
459. Infra Part IV.B. 
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A. Untaxed Bases and Minimizing Risk 
This section examines home growing as a potentially untapped tax base. 460 It 
then examines how issues with marijuana testing could negatively impact the 
expected revenue goals of Proposition 64.461 Then, using California’s medical 
marijuana market, it considers the potential for tax evasion.462 Finally, it 
examines the potential impact tourism may have on expected revenue in the 
recreational marijuana market in California.463 
1. Home Growing 
Compared to most illicit substances, marijuana is relatively easy to 
grow.464 It only requires a little bit of knowledge, space, and time.465 California 
allows for a maximum limit of 6 plants for personal use.466 But, even with a 
limitation on the number of plants, cannabis plants can become quite large and 
dense.467 This, therefore, makes up for the loss in the actual number of plants.468 
Even if California placed limitations by weight, compliance would be difficult 
because “one full-size outdoor plant can yield a pound of marijuana, which is 
more than three times the average annual per capita consumption.”469 
Washington limits home grown marijuana only to medical patients. 470 
The one benefit in this limitation is using home growing as a buffer against 
big corporations and vertical integration.471 The cost to start growing at home is 
“roughly $100 to get started . . . and for the horticulturally challenged, there are 
numerous idiot’s guide type books to show the way.”472 But, if production costs 
are driven down in the commercial sector, would home growing production 
 
460. Infra Part IV.B.1.  
461. Infra Part IV.B.2.  
462. Infra Part IV.B.3.  
463. Infra Part IV.B.4. 
464. See Gieringer, supra note 291 (highlighting that cannabis is cheaper than other recreational drugs, 
such as alcohol). 
465. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 175. 
466. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1(a)(3) (enacted by Cal. Prop. 64, approved Nov. 8, 2016, 
eff. Nov. 9, 2016). 
467. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 175. 
468. Id. 
469. Id.  
470. Id. at 217–18. 
471. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 29. 
472. Mikos, supra note 60, at 238–39. 
 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49 
195 
become cheaper and better, too?473 Selling do-it-yourself type equipment would 
surely make a profit, and consequently, could generate the state more tax 
revenue.474 
In addition, home growing would likely be most attractive to heavy users.475 
Statistics show that heavy cannabis users account for a large portion of the total 
market.476 Specifically, some estimates observe daily users “account[ing] for 
60% of the total market.”477 In Colorado, it has been observed that unregulated 
home growing accounted for around “9%” of the market.478 Likely, it may be 
years before states know the exact number of home growers, but home growers 
are there, and they have potential to take a big chunk of revenue from the state.479 
When considering potential tax savings, home cultivation will most likely take up 
a portion of the market.480 Thus, it is worth the legislatures consideration to 
develop a tax scheme before this becomes a problem.481 
 
473. See Zara Stone, The “Grow Your Own Marijuana at Home” Industry Is Booming, THE HUSTLE 
(Nov. 3, 2015), https://thehustle.co/the-grow-your-own-marijuana-at-home-industry-is-growing-fast (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (predicting that the accessory market [such as home growing 
equipment] for cannabis will eventually be worth more that the direct sale market); cf. Debra Borchardt, 
Marijuana Prices Fall In 2016 As Growers Flood The Market With Pot, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/01/31/marijuana-prices-fall-in-2016-as-growers-flood-the-
market-with-pot/#acb5f502f7f3 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (predicting that 
“growers will turn to agricultural technology in order to drive down the cost of producing a pound of 
marijuana”). 
474. See Stone, supra note 466 (predicting that the accessory market (such as home growing equipment) 
for cannabis will eventually be worth more that the direct sale market); cf. Borchardt, supra note 466 
(predicting that “growers will turn to agricultural technology in order to drive down the cost of producing a 
pound of marijuana”); see also KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78 (pointing out that a price based tax has the 
potential to make marijuana prices too high or too low because it “amplifies changes in pretax price 
automatically”); see also BRC Report, supra note 10, at 49–51 (discussing the difficulty of determining the 
actual price of cannabis). 
475. See Gieringer, supra note 291, at 8 (reasoning that home-growing would “be most attractive to 
heavy users with little money”). 
476. See id. (highlighting that heavy consumers “are estimated to account for 60% of the total market”). 
477. Id. 
478. LIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at 6. 
479. See Gieringer, supra note 291, at 8 (highlighting that heavy consumers “are estimated to account for 
60% of the total market”); see also Mikos, supra note 60, at 246 (arguing that the ease of growing marijuana at 
homes means that it has the capability of limiting the amount of revenue the state is able to generate on 
marijuana sales). 
480. See Mikos, supra note 60, at 246 (arguing that the ease of growing marijuana at homes means that it 
has the capability of limiting the amount of revenue the state is able to generate on marijuana sales). 
481. See id. (arguing that the ease of growing marijuana at homes means that it has the capability of 
limiting the amount of revenue the state is able to generate on marijuana sales). 
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2. Testing 
Regulations requiring every package to be individually tested and labeled 
have the potential to make a detrimental impact on the amount of revenue 
earned.482 On the other hand, the risk of contaminated cannabis presents a 
significant threat to public health, as well as a major impact on revenue loss.483 
The cost of such a system could be detrimental to the industry.484 Lately, it has 
been made known that cannabis in California is dirty.485 For example, in the 2015 
Emerald Cup, a Marijuana Festival in the Humboldt County area, 15% of the 
entries were found to contain contaminants, such as mold or pesticide.486 In 2016, 
“[f]orty flower entries tested positive for pesticides,” and “25% of concentrate 
entries” tested positive for banned chemicals.487 In contrast to this recent data, the 
Emerald Cup is typically an organic-minded competition that typically has 
cleaner bud than is found at most dispensaries.488 
Additionally, recent investigations and sample testing of legal cannabis in 
Los Angeles has shown most of the product contains high levels of pesticides, 
levels that would not be allowed in states that have adopted pesticide standards 
for legal cannabis.489 Per Dr. Don Land, a UC Davis chemistry professor and 
chief scientist for Steep Hill Labs, “most (70-85%) samples they test contain 
pesticides and ‘somewhere close to a third to a half [of the samples] would fail, 
say, by Oregon standards.’”490 And while most cannabis consumers and growers 
know that pesticides have been used for decades in illegal grows, testing is new, 
and the market may react differently.491 
 
482. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 138–39; see also Romero, supra note 339 (citing 
testing as a variable that may contribute to an increase in the price of marijuana). 
483. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 138–39; see also Romero, supra note 339 (citing 
testing as a variable that may contribute to an increase in the price of marijuana). 
484. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 138–39; see also Romero, supra note 339 (citing 
testing as a variable that may contribute to an increase in the price of marijuana). 
485.  Chris Roberts, Leafly Investigation: California Has a Dirty Cannabis Problem, LEAFLY (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.leafly.com/news/politics/leafly-investigation-california-dirty-cannabis-problem (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
486. Id.  
487. Id. 
488. Id. 
489. Joe Klare, Legal Pot’s Pesticide Problem: What Can Be Done About It, THE MARIJUANA TIMES 
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.marijuanatimes.org/legal-pots-pesticide-problem-what-can-be-done-about-it/ (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
490. Id.  
491. Id. 
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In response, the Bureau of Medical Cannabis (BMC) promised a 
refurbishment of testing regulations.492 Previously, Lori Ajax, head at the BMC, 
stated that her biggest concern was “whether there will be enough licensed labs 
to test all of the marijuana.”493 The state, however, will need to spend a lot of 
money to do this.494Ajax further stated that the barrier to testing is “expensive 
equipment and rigorous certifications.”495 Whatever the cost of getting a system 
up and running, customers need a legitimate testing system to “give [them] 
confidence in California’s market place,” and to mitigate any problems that may 
arise in the event of a marijuana recall.496 
To begin with, California should review the Blue-Ribbon commission’s 
suggestion for testing.497 That is, the “[t]esting of cannabis—for potency as well 
as for pesticides, molds and other contaminants—should occur near the points of 
harvesting and/or processing.”498 Further, they recommend testing to be included 
at each stage of inspection, to test every product and include key information 
about the product on each label.499 But again, multiple testing points are costly.500 
One possible avenue is to allow the industry to regulate itself with audits, but this 
could also prove costly in the long run.501 Nevertheless, California must address 
the problem before it is too late.502 
 
492. Id. 
493. David Garrick, Regulating Marijuana in California will be Turbulent: State Official Says, THE SAN 
DIEGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2017, 4:50 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/politics/sd-me-state-
pot-20170324-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
494. Id. 
495. Id. 
496. Hillary Bricken, Dirty Weed? California’s Marijuana Pesticide and Quality Assurance Issues, 
ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 4, 2017, 4:20 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2017/04/dirty-weed-californias-marijuana-
pesticide-and-quality-assurance-issues/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
497. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 24 (recommending that “testing of cannabis-for potency as well 
as for pesticides, molds and other contaminants-should occur near the points of harvesting and/or processing” 
and to be included at multiple points in the inspection process). 
498. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 24. 
499. Id. at 25. 
500. See Garrick, supra note 494 (noting that “testing labs need expensive equipment and rigorous 
certifications, creating significant barriers to entry”); see also CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 
139 (pointing out that testing “every package” would make “the cost of testing…prohibitive,” while less 
frequent testing could lead to a “greater risk of quality variations or contamination”). 
501. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 138–39. 
502. See, CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 139 (pointing out that testing “every 
package” would make “the cost of testing…prohibitive,” while less frequent testing could lead to a “greater risk 
of quality variations or contamination”); see also Garrick, supra note 486 (stating concerns over ensuring the 
proper testing procedures in time for the first day of recreational marijuana sales). 
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3. Abuse of the Medical Marijuana System 
The medical marijuana system presents another avenue for tax evasion.503 In 
California’s current medical marijuana system, patients with legitimate medical 
needs coexist with many who utilize the medical system as a workaround.504 In 
Washington, the potential of completely avoiding a large excise tax gives users a 
lot of incentive to stay.505 Heavy users, and those who generally spend more on 
cannabis, may see the medical market as a very attractive alternative for the price 
break.506 In addition, “[b]alanced against [market] benefits is the danger that 
some growers will also sell to the illicit market.” 507  
According to state officials in Colorado, the legal market, as opposed to the 
illegal market, accounts for “70% of total estimated demand for marijuana, with 
much of the rest covered by a ‘grey’ market of legally home-grown pot illegally 
sold.”508 But, “overtime, more than 90% of the market is expected to be supplied 
by regulated vendors.”509 Hence, currently many avoid paying the tax by 
purchasing through the medical market, rather than the recreational market.510 In 
Colorado, medical marijuana is not subject to the 10% sales tax at the point of 
sale, but it is still subject to the 15% excise tax.511 California exempts medical 
marijuana users from the 7.5% state sales tax.512 Likely, the effects of 
reconciliation between the markets will not be known for some time; however, 
tax evasion through the medical market is a point worth paying attention to.513 
On the other hand, the medical marijuana industry has a special relationship with 
certain members of the California community, and the state should give it some 
 
503. See California’s Billion-Dollar Medical Marijuana Market Offers Millions in Tax Revenues, supra 
note 236 (observing that because of federal penalties many participants in the medical marijuana market 
“operate underground completely unregulated and untaxed”). 
504. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 31–32. 
505. See id. at 32 (observing that where there is no excise tax on the medical market then those 
participating in it “are unlikely to move to the recreational system”). 
506. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 99 (describing the importance of a “tax break for heavy users 
because marijuana makes up a significant fraction of their personal budgets,” and have higher rates of use). 
507. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 29. 
508. Reeferegulatory Challenge, supra note 186.  
509. LIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at 6. 
510. CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 148. 
511. See Marijuana Taxes/Quick Answers, supra note 157. 
512. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 34012(j) (enacted by Cal. Prop. 64, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff. Nov. 9, 
2016) (allowing exemption for qualified patient or care giver under “§11362.1 of the Health and Safety Code. . . 
in accordance with the Compassionate Use Act”). 
513. See California’s Billion-Dollar Medical Marijuana Market Offers Millions in Tax Revenues, supra 
note 236 (summarizing a report in 2006 that “Californian’s consume between $870 million and $2billion worth 
of medical marijuana per year”). 
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level of respect.514 Thus, state observation of the medical marijuana market, will 
likely have a large impact on minimizing tax evasion.515 
4. California Dreaming: The Impact of Tourism on the Cannabis Economy 
In Colorado, the Marijuana Policy Group (MPG) found visitor demand was 
one of the major factors contributing to the state’s revenue return.516 In 2015, 
Colorado hosted “77.7 million visitors…[who] spent an all-time high of $19.1 
billion.”517 In that same year, Denver’s hotel-room occupancy rate was at 76%, 
despite the opening of 14 new hotels in the metro area.518 Similarly, after 
legalization of cannabis in Oregon, Washington began to notice a decline in sales 
in counties along the border.519 In 2017, a survey by a market research firm 
specializing in cannabis showed “that one-in-five tourists are more interested in 
visiting an American state if it has legalized cannabis.”520 Listed at the top is 
Colorado and California, followed by Washington, Oregon and Nevada.521 
To everyone’s “surprise,” the novelty of marijuana edibles may be 
contributing to this large uptick in demand for cannabis tourism.522 This may be 
because it is easy for tourists to consume them in public and in places that ban 
smoking in common indoor areas.523 Moreover, they usually provide more bang 
for the proverbial buck.524 In 2016, there were “268.6 million total person-trips” 
to the state of California.525 The U.S. Department of Commerce forecast this 
 
514. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 12 (stating that the nation’s oldest medical marijuana “industry 
serves a large number of patients who legitimately need and benefit from medical marijuana”). 
515. See Mikos, supra note 60, at 235 (stating that the state’s ability to observe the marijuana market will 
have a large impact on detecting tax evasion). 
516. LIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, at 8. 
517. Jason Blevins, Colorado Breaks Tourism Record with 77.7 Million Visitors Spending $19.1 Billion, 
DENVER POST, (July 21, 2016, 9:55 AM) http://www.denverpost.com/2016/07/20/record-colorado-tourism-
2015/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
518. Markus, supra note 183. 
519. Id. 
520. James Mclure, California And Colorado Are The Top Destinations For Cannabis Tourism, Says 
Survey, CIVILIZED LIFE (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.civilized.life/articles/california-colorado-cannabis-
tourism/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
521. Id. 
522. See CAULKINS, KILMER & KLEIMAN, supra note 10, at 220–21 (pointing out that the biggest surprise 
is the emergency room visits caused by ingesting high amounts of potent edibles). 
523. Id. 
524. See id. (highlighting the “low cost of extraction done at a large scale” and the difficulties 
encountered when people eat more than the recommended dose of candy). 
525. California Statistics & Trends, VISIT CAL., http://industry.visitcalifornia.com/Find-Research/ 
California-Statistics-Trends/ (last visited on Apr. 20, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
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figure will continue to rise.526 With the legalization of marijuana, and evidence 
showing that there is a small market for cannabis tourism, it is important that 
California does not allow this potential revenue to slip through the cracks.527 
B. Policy Implications of Adopting the RAND Findings 
This section analyses the practical implications of adopting additional tax 
bases to optimize revenue in California’s recreational marijuana market.528 It then 
considers the practical implications of adopting a tax policy that maximizes 
revenue through minimizing risk.529 Finally, it evaluates the benefits of California 
introducing its taxes one by one rather than all at once. 530 
1. Tapping into the Power of Untaxed Bases 
By utilizing other tax bases, California could minimize tax evasion and 
optimize revenue.531 Specifically, developing real-estate-, electricity-, and 
potency-based excise taxes in advance will allow California to minimize the risk 
of tax evasion and optimize potential revenue.532 As noted above, indoor home 
growing could make up a portion of the market and help fuel the illicit market.533 
This is particularly so if heavy consumers are the ones doing the growing.534  
Accordingly, California could utilize electricity-based taxes to capture this 
untapped market and simultaneously shrink the illicit market.535 For example, 
 
526. Id. 
527. See Patrick McGreevy, Legal Marijuana Could Be a $5-Billion Boon to California’s Economy, L.A. 
TIMES (Jun. 11, 2017, 12:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-pot-economic-study-20170611-
story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (predicting legalization to boost California’s 
tourism economy because of an expected increase in tourists from states that have not legalized marijuana yet). 
528. Infra Part IV.B.1. 
529. Infra Part IV.B.2. 
530. Infra Part IV.B.3. 
531. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 85 (concluding that it might be effective to “consider 
combining several tax bases”). 
532. See BRC Report, supra note 10 at 51 (reasoning that because “legalization is a process…the state 
may benefit from implementing tax rules in phases or steps…and those phases and steps may coexist with an 
evolving and maturing market place”); see also KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 85, 90–91 (concluding that it 
might be effective to “consider combining several tax bases,” and recommending a “staggered start for tax 
bases,” and “introducing them one by one). 
533. Supra Part IV.A.1. (reviewing the potential for missed tax revenue by not capturing the indoor home 
growing marijuana market). 
534. See Gieringer, supra note 291 at 8 (highlighting that heavy consumers “are estimated to account for 
60% of the total market”). 
535. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 85 (reviewing the approach of the city of Arcata, which utilizes 
an indoor-electricity add-on base, “has the advantage of taxing both legal and illegal growers). 
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Arcata, California “presumes that abnormally high use of electricity correlates 
with marijuana growing under high-powered lights.”536 When high electrical use 
triggers the presumption, the state assesses the tax.537 Although tax collectors 
would tailor this type of tax toward indoor growing, it is easy to set up and is cost 
efficient.538 Further, it is difficult to conceal the amount of electricity one is 
using, making this a difficult tax to evade.539 This not only creates additional 
revenue, but it also works to curb environmental damage from excessive 
electricity use and deter tax evasion.540 However, the utility of such a tax would 
be doubtful if most growing took place outdoors or in a green house.541 On 
balance, an electricity excise tax, as part of a broader taxation scheme, may help 
capture the indoor grow market.542 
In addition, a potency-based tax would likely correlate to the THC or CBD 
content of marijuana.543 This tax measures the psychoactive components of 
cannabis and could capture another untapped tax base. Eventually, California 
could use a potency-based tax as a type of secondary tax.544 That is, if there is no 
system in place for the state check the validity of the alleged THC content of 
cannabis, then one option is to “use the seller’s reported or claimed THC content 
as a secondary or backup alternative minimum tax of sorts.”545 Accordingly, this 
would be an excellent supplement to weight-based taxes.546 Likely, a potency-
based tax will take years to develop, so the process should start sooner rather 




538. Id. at 86, Table 5.1. 
539. Id. at 85 (reviewing the approach of the city of Arcata, which utilizes an indoor-electricity add-on 
base, “has the advantage of taxing both legal and illegal growers); see also id. at 86, Table 5.1 (noting a low 
potential for gaming). 
540. Id. at 85. 
541. See id. (pointing out that a tax base based on electricity will not be effective in detecting growing 
done outdoors or in green houses). 
542. See id. (concluding that “this base would best serve as a green add-on to another, more substantial 
base”). 
543. BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51 (the “tax rate could be . . . adjusted down for the presence of CBD, 
which may have a mitigating effect on CBD”). 
544. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 84 (reasoning that although a potency based tax is to 
susceptible to “gaming” as a primary tax, it could be utilized as “an alternative minimum tax base;” triggering 
only when the primary tax base does not capture the true value of the product). 
545. Id. at 84.  
546. Id. (proposing that a weight based tax will motivate market participants to pack “thc” into marijuana 
to make it stronger, and avoid paying taxes on the extra value). 
547. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51 (suggesting that potency based taxes will become more 
relevant once the testing industry for marijuana evolves).  
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broader taxing scheme that capitalizes on the potential of untaxed bases in the 
market and deters tax evasion.548 
2. Scheduling Future Rate Increases: The “Low and Slow” Technique 
A tax scheme that focuses on high rates of returns in the short run is riskier 
than a policy that errs on a lower rate of return over the long term.549 As noted 
above, California’s tax scheme is susceptible to the problem of high prices in a 
new recreational system, which could lead to devastating results. 550 First, 
California’s weight-based tax will take time and money to set up.551 Plus, because 
of California’s ad valorem tax will amplify changes in price.552 Thus, if 
California experiences initial high prices, this could slow industry growth and 
polarize consumers to the black and medical markets.553 Furthermore, issues with 
potency testing an unregulated medical market, and issues under federal law, 
could exacerbate the problem.554 
Likely, predicting the price of cannabis will be virtually impossible.555 But, 
the legislature can minimize risk by taking a less aggressive approach to 
taxing.556 That is, the state can err on the side of facilitating the industry and 
marginalizing the black market; as opposed to erring on the side of overtaxing 
the industry and expanding the illegal market.557 By taking a less aggressive 
 
548. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 76–87 (concluding that “this base would best serve as a green 
add-on to another, more substantial base”). 
549. Id. at 88 (predicting that the “marijuana market will not soon be stable” and that “revenue would 
suffer from too ambitious a tax plan). 
550. Supra Part III.A (reviewing potential issues that could arise under prop. 64). 
551. See Oglesby, supra note 27 (stating that “a weight based tax takes time to set up”). 
552. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78 (pointing out that a price based tax has the potential to make 
marijuana prices too high or too low because it “amplifies changes in pretax price automatically”); see also 
BRC Report, supra note 10, at 49–51 (discussing the difficulty of determining the actual price of cannabis). 
553. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78 (pointing out that if the pretax price is too low, a price 
based tax could push the price of marijuana down to levels that are dangerous for an industry in its infancy). 
554. See California’s Billion-Dollar Medical Marijuana Market Offers Millions in Tax Revenues, supra 
note 236 (observing that because of federal penalties many participants in the medical marijuana market 
“operate underground completely unregulated and untaxed”); see also McErlean, supra note 422, at 1098–99 
(analyzing how the issues of banking and tax as being a threat to the legal marijuana system’s viability). 
555. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 49–51 (discussing the difficulty of determining the actual price of 
cannabis). 
556. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 88 (predicting that the “marijuana market will not soon be 
stable” and that “revenue would suffer from too ambitious a tax plan”); see also Oglesby, supra note 27 
(pointing out that the “start low and go slow” technique is best for marijuana tax policy). 
557. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 88 (predicting that the “marijuana market will not soon be 
stable” and that “revenue would suffer from too ambitious a tax plan”); see also Oglesby, supra note 27 
(pointing out that the “start low and go slow” technique is best for marijuana tax policy). 
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approach to taxing, the legislature can help the industry by not working against 
it.558 In California, the tax system on marijuana should “start low and go slow,” 
with a goal toward long-term revenue gain.559 Especially when those who will be 
participating in the market already disgruntled over the taxes that are piling up at 
the county and local level. 560 
Likely, the price of cannabis will eventually fall; so as this happens, the 
legislature could mirror the projected drop-in-price with an increased tax rate.561 
But California already anchors the tax rate on cultivation and retail at a high rate, 
which will make it difficult to increase in the future.562 If California needs to 
raise the current tax rate, the public outcry will surely be greater than if the tax 
went from 8% to 9%, or 9% to 10%.563 That is, even if California picked the right 
number, they should have started lower and allowed room to increase the rate.564 
Indeed, California would be wise to adopt the RAND study suggestion to 
“schedule rate increases in advance” by specific amounts.565 By knowing what 
the market is generally going to do in advance, California should schedule future 
tax increases, then mirror the projected market price, and adjust as needed.566 As 
discussed in the BRC Report, this is similar to “gradually raising the minimum 
 
558. See Oglesby, supra note 27 (identifying the benefit in taking a more conservative approach when 
taxing cannabis). 
559. Oglesby, supra note 27. 
560. McGreevy, supra note 422. 
561. See Borchardt, supra note 474 (predicting that “growers will turn to agricultural technology in order 
to drive down the cost of producing a pound of marijuana”); see also BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51, 54 
(reasoning that slowly increasing the tax “gives businesses the time to adjust,” and discussing how cannabis tax 
policy takes time, is a “process,” and should be flexible adapt to the needs of the market as it changes over 
time). 
562. See McGreevy, supra note 422 (discussing the cloud of concern hovering over the cost of marijuana 
as “cities and counties pile their own taxes of up to 15% on top of the 15% state excise tax approved by 
voters”); see also KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 90 (highlighting the goal of scheduling future rate increases 
is to “try to maintain prices that consumers would pay”); see also Romero, supra note 339 (citing inventory, 
compliance with laws, demand, testing and experiences of other states as all possible variables that may 
contribute to an increase in the price of marijuana). 
563. Medical Marijuana Advocates Worry Pot Price Spike Coming to California, CBS LOS ANGELES (Jun. 9, 
2017, 1:37 PM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2017/06/09/medical-marijuana-price-spike-california/ (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (observing the growing concern from advocates that the 
marijuana prices will rise after legalization). 
564. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 54 (reasoning that slowly increasing the tax “gives businesses the 
time to adjust”). 
565. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 90. 
566. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 54 (reasoning that slowly increasing the tax “gives businesses the 
time to adjust”). 
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wage.”567 This would not only protect the industry from a shaky start but also a 
price collapse, and likely would lead to long term revenue gains.568  
3. A Staggered Start for Tax Bases 
California should introduce its taxes one by one, rather than all at once.569 
That is because different taxes will need different amounts of time to set up.570 
Less tax bases relieve industry pressure similar to lower starting prices.571 
Electricity, real estate, and ad valorem taxes are easy and inexpensive to set up.572 
On the other hand, weight-based taxes “require [the] establishment of standards, 
procedures, and weighing locations.”573 Clearly, some of the pressure put on the 
regulatory structure to perform would be alleviated by taking the time to properly 
set up the weight-based excise tax system.574 Especially considering if there is a 
rush to get the weight-based tax set up, there will likely be a significant learning 
curve.. 575 Hence, it would be best to take the time required to do the job right 
once and allow “price taxes to lead the way in the ‘tax-base march of 
progress.’”576 
 
567. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 54 (explaining that “scheduled rate increases, like the gradual 
increase in the minimum hourly wage in Los Angeles to $15 by 2020, give businesses time to adjust”). 
568. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 88 (predicting that the “marijuana market will not soon be 
stable” and that “revenue would suffer from too ambitious a tax plan”); see also Oglesby, supra note 27 
(pointing out that the “start low and go slow” technique is best for marijuana tax policy). 
568. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 75 (discussing the “undesirable side effects” of high taxes); see 
also id. at 75 (highlighting that “low taxes would tend to allow a nascent market to compete with local black 
and gray markets; to provide a low-cost product to consumers; to limit regressively; and to increase compliance 
with tax laws, thus reducing enforcement and collection costs”). 
569. See e.g., KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 90–91(reviewing the benefits of introducing tax bases one 
by one); BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51 (noting that delaying some of the different tax bases could help the 
industry get on its feet). 
570. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 90–91 (comparing real estate and electricity taxes, which can 
start immediately, to price-based taxes which require time to set up, and weight based taxes which take much 
longer than the aforementioned bases). 
571. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51 (pointing out that a delay in implementing tax bases would 
allow the industry and board of equalization the proper amount of time to effectively set up the market). 
572. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 90–91 (comparing real estate and electricity taxes, which can 
start immediately, to price-based taxes which require time to set up, and weight based taxes which take much 
longer than the aforementioned bases). 
573. Id. at 91. 
574. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51 (pointing out that a delay in implementing tax bases would 
allow the industry and board of equalization the proper amount of time to effectively set up the market). 
575. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51(recommending that the industry could benefit from the delay 
of a weight based excise tax). 
576. Oglesby, supra note 27. 
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Further, as the market fluctuates, the industry can reflect those changes in the 
tax base that they use.577 Developing secondary taxes in advance, such as 
potency, real-estate, and electric, would help prepare for any unexpected 
fluctuations.578 Thus, allowing the market to adjust quickly to changing 
circumstances and avoid unnecessary delay that may slow industry growth.579 
That way, the tax scheme could adjust quickly and maximize potential revenue in 
the market.580 
V. CONCLUSION 
California should adopt several mechanisms for changing the tax burden, as 
recommended in RAND for adjusting the marijuana tax rate.581 For instance, by 
scheduling future increases in the tax rate,582 alongside the addition of various tax 
bases, California could minimize revenue loss and account for potential untapped 
tax bases.583 A tax scheme motivated by profits in the short run will fail to 
optimize revenue in the long run.584 Hence, the legislature should pursue a 
cannabis tax policy that focuses on reducing risk and facilitating growth by 
mirroring its expected trajectory, rather than cutting against it.585 Accordingly, 
California could ground its tax structure so that uncontrollable and unknowable 
factors do not impact tax revenue as greatly.586 The state’s achieved revenue 
largely depends on several unknowable and unpredictable variables.587 Hence, no 
 
577. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 48–52 (highlighting that the “steps in the process” may evolve 
with the market place). 
578. See KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 85–86 (concluding it may be advantageous to “consider 
combining several tax bases”); see also, BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51 (highlighting that the “steps in the 
process” may evolve with the market place). 
579. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 51 (pointing out that a delay in implementing tax bases would 
allow the industry and board of equalization the proper amount of time to effectively set up the market); see 
also KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 91 (pointing out that some bases are easier to implement than others). 
580. Cf. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 88 (reasoning that the industry would “suffer from too 
ambitious a tax plan”). 
581. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the policy recommendations as recommended by Rand for taxing 
marijuana).  
582. See supra Part IV.B.2 (reasoning that a low and slow technique would minimize short term risk and 
maximize long term gain). 
583. See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the implications of adopting a staggered start for tax bases, 
alongside adding additional tax bases). 
584. See supra Part IV.B (discussing a slow and steady start for taxes that gradually increases with time). 
585. See BRC Report, supra note 10, at 54 (reasoning that slowly increasing the tax “gives businesses the 
time to adjust”). 
586. See supra Part III (discussing potential issues that may arise in California’s recreational market). 
587. Vitiello, supra note 19, at 782 (discussing how much additional tax revenue depends on “many 
variables, including methods of implementation of marijuana laws”). 
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matter what policy a state choses, it “will not fit for long.”588 Irrefutably, the 
“industry will evolve in unpredictable ways,” forcing legislation to continuously 
revise and change the law.589 Thus, the key for any policy toward cannabis is 
flexibility.590 Regardless, one state at a time, legal cannabis is seemingly here to 
stay, and California’s sociopolitical weight is sure to take a prominent role in 
establishing the legal framework of the industry’s future.591 
 
588. KILMER ET AL., supra note 11, at 88. 
589. Id.  
590. See id. (stating that whatever policy is “chosen it will not fit for long”). 
591. See Margolin, supra note 8 (discussing the inevitable industrialization of the marijuana industry, and 
California’s potential to further validate it). 
